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A REIGN OF ERROR: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
STARE DECISIS 
MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF* 
ABSTRACT 
Mistakes matter in law, even the smallest ones. What would happen if a 
small but substantively meaningful typographical error appeared in the 
earliest published version of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion and remained 
uncorrected for several decades in versions of the decision published by the 
two leading commercial companies and in several online databases? And 
what would happen if judges, legal commentators, and practitioners wrote 
opinions, articles, and other legal materials that incorporated and built on 
that mistake? In answering these questions, this Article traces the 
widespread, exponential replication of an error (first appearing in 1928) in 
numerous subsequent cases and other law and law-related sources; 
explores why the phenomenon of reproducing mistakes matters in a legal 
system whose lifeblood is words and that heavily relies on the principle of 
stare decisis; and argues that one legacy of this cautionary tale of an 
unforced error can be a functional understanding of how the Due Process, 
Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses can and should protect private 
property rights in different yet related ways. 
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The number of people who read Supreme Court opinions carefully 
and the varied expertise of those readers are enormous. Every word, 
every fact, every characterization of the facts, and every discussion 
of background legal doctrine is subject to close scrutiny. Errors will 
be discovered and reported, if not immediately, then eventually, 
perhaps nearly a hundred years later. 
Richard J. Lazarus1 
I think the only issue is . . . if there was a property right, was it taken. 
This Court has said in the State of Washington v. Roberge that the 
	
1. Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 











right to devote one’s land to a legitimate use is property within the 
protection of the Constitution. 
Supreme Court oral argument in PFZ Properties, Inc. 
v. Rodriguez2 
INTRODUCTION 
What would happen if a typographical error, very small but substantively 
meaningful, appeared in the earliest published version of a U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion and remained uncorrected for several decades in case reports 
published by the two leading commercial companies and in several online 
databases? And what would happen if judges, commentators, and 
practitioners wrote opinions, articles, and other legal materials that 
incorporated that mistake? These are not hypothetical questions spun by a 
clever law professor; they are inquiries based on real facts.  
On February 13, 2019, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Gerald Tjoflat 
closed the book on a property rights dispute originating in Hillcrest 
Property’s application, in December, 2006, to develop an “83,000 square-
foot retail shopping center and three commercial spaces” in Pasco County, 
Florida. 3  Five years before, the county and the Florida Department of 
Transportation promised to compensate Hillcrest $4.7 million for a 100-foot 
strip needed for future road development, and Hillcrest agreed to drop its 
Fifth Amendment takings claim. 4  However, Hillcrest kept alive an as-
applied substantive due process claim, for which it sought nine years of 
attorney’s fees.5 
Judge Tjoflat displayed scant sympathy for Hillcrest’s attempt to erase 
litigation costs and for its legal theory, including counsel’s misplaced 
reliance on one of the Supreme Court’s earliest zoning decisions: 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roberge . . .  another 
decision of the Supreme Court that Hillcrest flags, is yet another 
police-power case. . . .  
Hillcrest cites a single line within the opinion: “The right of the 
trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the 
protection of the Constitution.” But that language has no significance 
	
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 
91-122) (italics missing in original) [hereinafter PFZ Oral Argument Transcript]. 
3. Hillcrest Prop., L.L.P. v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019). 
4. See id. at 1296–97. 
5. See id. at 1297. The trial judge awarded $1 in damages for this as-applied claim, leaving open 
the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. Hillcrest Prop., L.L.C. v. Pasco Cnty., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 











here when the entire paragraph is devoted to discussing whether the 
enactment at issue accords with the police power.6 
The effort to recoup attorneys’ fees and costs came up short: “[R]egardless 
of how arbitrarily or irrationally the County has acted with respect to 
Hillcrest, Hillcrest has no substantive-due-process claim.”7 
Hillcrest’s counsel, like counsel in dozens of state and federal cases, 
quoted language from the 1928 decision in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title 
Trust Co. v. Roberge8 in support of their aggressive defense of property 
rights against unsympathetic land use regulators. Unfortunately, these briefs 
and opinions include a very small, but meaningful, mistake, because Justice 
Butler’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Roberge in actuality reads, “The 
right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is properly [not 
‘property’] within the protection of the Constitution.”9  
This Article traces the widespread, exponential replication of an error 
that first appeared in the earliest released version of Roberge. The Article 
shows how the error reappears in numerous cases and other sources well 
into the twenty-first century, explores why the phenomenon of reproducing 
mistakes matters in a legal system whose lifeblood is words and that heavily 
relies on stare decisis, and ponders lessons gleaned from this very real, 
cautionary tale. 
For more than ninety years, litigators; authors and editors of law review 
articles, books, treatises, encyclopedias, case reporter headings and 
summaries, and statutory compilations; and, most importantly, trial and 
appellate judges, have cited, relied upon, and reproduced an error that first 
appeared when the Court released the text of Justice Butler’s ruling as a slip 
opinion to the public generally and to West Publishing Company (compiler 
of the Supreme Court Reporter) and Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 
Company (compiler of the United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers’ 
Edition) specifically.10 The error was corrected in the Preliminary Print and 
	
6. Hillcrest, 915 F.3d at 1300 n.11 (citations omitted) (misquoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title & 
Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928)). Hillcrest’s counsel actually quoted the correct word from 
Roberge, although in an earlier brief he had included the incorrect word. Compare Answer Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Hillcrest Property, L.L.P. at 34, Hillcrest Prop., L.L.P. v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292 
(11th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-14789), 2018 WL 1007904, at *34 (“is properly”), with Answer Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellee at 33, Hillcrest Prop., L.L.C. v. Pasco Cnty., 754 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-
12383), 2013 WL 4648213, at *33 (“is property”). 
7. Hillcrest, 915 F.3d at 1302. 
8. 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
9. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
10. Roberge, 49 S. Ct. 50, 52 (“The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is 
property within the protection of the Constitution.”). Headnote 3, id. at 50, only compounds the error: 
“Right of person to devote his land to any legitimate use is ‘property,’ within the protection of Const. 
Amend. 14, providing property shall not be taken without due process of law.” See also Roberge, 73 L. 











in permanent Volume 278 of the United States Reports.11 Nevertheless, 
even today, when judges, lawyers, students, and other consumers of 
Supreme Court opinions rely on Thomson Reuters Westlaw, they are misled 
by the text of the Roberge opinion and by West Headnote 2, which 
incorrectly reads: “Right of owner to devote his land to any legitimate use 
is ‘property,’ within due process clause.”12 The mistake also appears in 
versions of the case posted on Cornell University Law School’s Legal 
Information Institute site,13 and on the Justia,14 Wikisource,15 and Fastcase 
sites.16   
Despite the correct language in the official reporter and in the LexisNexis 
version (though not in the LexisNexis headnotes17), attorneys in dozens of 
briefs filed between 1930 and 2020 (including one by future FBI Director 
James B. Comey 18 ), many seeking to persuade courts to extend the 
Constitution’s already ample protections of property rights one large step 
further, have invoked and sought support from the Roberge language 
featuring the improper t.  The ultimate outcomes of most cases were, 
thankfully, unaffected by this misquotation. In other instances, courts, 
relying at least in part on this still-uncorrected error, have rendered 
substantive opinions that expand property rights protection at the expense 
of sensible land use regulations. And attorneys continue to offer the 
incorrect language in pursuing due process and takings challenges against 
longstanding land use regulatory practices. 
	
protection of the Constitution."). Headnote 3, id. at 201, echoes the mistake: “The right to devote real 
estate to any legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution.” 
11. See infra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
12. Roberge, 49 S. Ct. at 50. 
13. See State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, Superintendent of 
Building of City of Seattle, LEGAL INFO. INST.,  https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/278/116 
[https://perma.cc/PY4C-F83E]. 
14. Washington ex Rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), JUSTIA, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/278/116/ [https://perma.cc/YVX5-QMGF]. 
15. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge/Opinion of the Court, WIKISOURCE, 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Washington_ex_rel._Seattle_Title_Trust_Company_v._Roberge/Opinio
n_of_the_Court [https://perma.cc/V69U-47SY]. 
16. State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, Superintendent of Building 
of City of Seattle, HEIN ONLINE FASTCASE, https://heinonline-
org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/HOL/CaseLaw?1=1&native_id=356350&cop=&collection=journals# (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2021). The Bloomberg Law and Google Scholar versions of Roberge do not include the 
“property” mistake. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, 
BLOOMBERG L.,  https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X5BU1V; see also Washington ex rel. 
Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5253904659925356181&q=seattle+trust+v+roberge&hl
=en&as_sdt=40003 [https://perma.cc/B6BC-Y45K].  
17.  Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge 278 U.S. 116, Headnote 3, (1928) 
(LexisNexis). The LexisNexis version of Roberge is identical with the (incorrect) Lawyers’ Edition 
version. See supra note 10. 











This Article is divided into four substantive sections followed by closing 
thoughts. Part I reviews the chief constitutional provisions that protect 
private property owners from arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory 
regulations of the use of land, and shows how the mistaken reading of 
Roberge gives false hope to counsel, judges, and commentators who believe 
those protections are not robust enough. Part II provides the background of 
the Roberge litigation culminating in the Court’s slip opinion, explains how 
and when the mistake was officially corrected, and highlights the earliest 
sources that replicated the error. Part III traces two lines of authorities 
developing over several decades: those quoting the correct language and 
those duplicating the mistake. Part IV explores why this mistake matters, 
arguing that the legacy of this simple error can be a proper understanding of 
how the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses 
comprehensively protect property private property rights in different though 
related ways. In the wider context, the tale of this error exposes the fragility 
of a system of constitutional lawmaking based on the principle of stare 
decisis. The Conclusion reviews lessons learned from this curious, if not 
unique, dramedy of errors. In a world in which lightning-quick Wikipedia 
and Google searches too often substitute for careful research, the tale of the 
improper t reminds us of the importance of taking the time and effort to 
check the original source, especially when what is seen on the page or screen 
looks too good to be true. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR LANDOWNERS: COMPREHENSIVE 
OR DEFICIENT? 
As with all government regulation affecting private property,19 in the 
context of zoning and other forms of state and local land use regulation there 
are two kinds of owners who claim that government officials have violated 
their constitutional rights: (1) those owners entitled to make productive use 
of property who want to be left alone, and (2) those owners who want to 
make more intensive and lucrative use of their property but first need to 
secure government permission. As Figure 1 below illustrates, landowners in 
both categories are not without recourse should they be subjected to 
arbitrary and confiscatory treatment. There is no “gap in coverage,” and, as 
an added bonus, under §§ 1983 and 1988, 20 should the court hold a local 
government responsible for constitutional violations, damages and 
attorneys’ fees are available. Nevertheless, private property rights advocates 
believe that the courts still have not gone far enough to protect landowners.  
	
19. It is hard to think of any form of regulation that has no impact on property broadly defined 
to include intellectual property, contract rights, choses in action, securities, and more. 











Four Clauses of the Constitution provide the strongest protections for 
real property owners: the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although on its face (and 
based on its pre-framing history and original understanding) the Takings 
Clause appears to apply only to the affirmative exercise of eminent 
domain,21 for several decades the Supreme Court has also applied 
 
* For example, the local government downzones the property from commercial to residential use. 
** For example, the owner seeks a rezoning from residential to commercial use, or a variance, or a 
special use permit, or permission to develop a subdivision. 
***See, e.g., Mendota Golf, L.L.P. v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 176-80 (Minn. 2006) 
(discussing mandamus in the zoning context). 
 
NOTE: The following situations would also implicate the Takings Clause: (1) the government 
condemns the property using its power of eminent domain (e.g., Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005)), (2) the government compels a permanent physical occupation of the property (e.g., Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)), (3) the government conditions 
development approval upon the exaction of a real or personal property interest from the owner (e.g., 





21. The best treatments remain William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995), and William Michael Treanor, 
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 











the requirement that private property can only be taken for public use upon 
the payment of just compensation to instances of compelled physical 
occupation by the government22 and to regulations that are the functional 
equivalent of a taking by eminent domain in part because they reduce or 
even eliminate the value of the affected property.23 In addition, when the 
government exacts from a landowner real or personal property (including 
monetary payments) as a condition for receiving development permission, 
the Court has imposed protections to ensure that the condition is not 
unconstitutional.24 
Even though the Supreme Court has significantly broadened the reach of 
the Takings Clause far beyond eminent domain, private property rights 
advocates are nonetheless frustrated by several aspects of takings 
jurisprudence including ripeness requirements for federal court claims;25 the 
Court’s consideration of “the parcel as a whole” when determining the 
extent of the diminution in value of property negatively affected by 
regulation;26 and the Court’s use of a multi-factor test that often favors the 
government when regulations allegedly effect partial regulatory takings.27 
The Due Process Clauses have two components—procedural (as 
suggested by their very words) and substantive (oxymoronic to some).28 
	
22. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“We 
conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to 
the public interests that it may serve.”). 
23. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“Although our regulatory 
takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these three inquiries . . . share a common 
touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking 
in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”). 
24. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013) (“[T]he 
government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of 
Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for 
money.”). 
25. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) 
(“[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not 
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”), overruled in part by Knick v. 
Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). But see Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (“We now conclude that the 
state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest 
of our takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled.”). 
26. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (“In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the 
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
whole . . . .”); see also Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017)  (“Considering petitioners’ 
property as a whole, the state court was correct to conclude that petitioners cannot establish a 
compensable taking in these circumstances.”). 
27. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, 
the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.”). 
28. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (“It has become an 
article of faith in some quarters that due process pertains entirely to matters of procedure. Thus, John 











Under procedural due process, if the government deprives a landowner of 
property (or, in other contexts, life or liberty), the owner is entitled to 
sufficient notice and a fair hearing, but the Court has stated that post-
deprivation procedures will often be sufficient.29 Substantive due process is 
more complicated and potentially much more valuable to landowners who 
believe that the government has confiscated their property or treated them 
unfairly. Landowners who have vested property rights can prevail if they 
can carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that there is not an adequate 
connection between the government regulation of land and the legitimate 
goals of the police power, which are usually listed as the protection of public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.30 The standard used in most 
federal cases is that the government activities that give rise to the 
landowner’s legal challenge must “shock the conscience.”31 
Property rights advocates would like to see major modifications in 
substantive due process jurisprudence, such as relaxation of the requirement 
in several federal circuits that the plaintiff be entitled to the property of 
which the owner is allegedly deprived, replacement of the “shock the 
conscience” standard with a test that is less indulgent of government 
officials, and increased judicial scrutiny because of the purported 
fundamentality of private property rights.32 
Landowners often include counts alleging violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause in complaints alleging that other owners are treated more 
favorably by government officials, often in tandem with due process and 
takings claims. Indeed, the earliest Supreme Court zoning cases often paired 
	
contradiction in terms—sort of like “green pastel redness.”’ Other observers have also derided 
substantive due process as an ‘oxymoron.’” (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980))). 
29. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional 
deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the 
loss is available.”). 
30. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (“The governmental power 
to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character 
of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not 
bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”).  
31. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Litigating Land Use Cases in Federal Court: A Substantive 
Due Process Primer, 55 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 69, 76 (2020) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)) (“Part V discusses the judicial review standards federal courts apply to 
substantive due process claims in land use cases. These standards protect government conduct, 
especially the highly protective 'shocks the conscience' standard, which the Supreme Court adopted in a 
police chase case.”). 
32. The leading champion of enhanced substantive due process protections in the land use setting 
is Professor Steven Eagle. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: 
A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 981 (2000) (“This Article advocates increased recognition of the 
need for discerning whether governmental restrictions on private property is legitimate under due 











equal protection and due process claims.33 Because the right to use private 
real property is not included in the set of individual rights deemed 
fundamental under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, plaintiffs in run-
of-the-mill zoning and land use regulation disputes34 must carry the same 
heavy burden of proof as those bringing ordinary substantive due process 
claims.  
There is one silver lining among these dark clouds. In its 2000 per curiam 
decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,35 the Court affirmed a ruling 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that allowed an equal 
protection claim to proceed brought by a landowner who “alleg[ed] that the 
Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of 
connecting her property to the municipal water supply where the Village 
required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property 
owners.”36 Olech claimed that the village’s behavior “was ‘irrational and 
wholly arbitrary’” and “motivated by ill will.” 37  The Justices were 
untroubled by the fact that “the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class 
or group,” 38  noting that “[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal 
protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that 
she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated 
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”39 
While Olech may enable plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss (and 
thereby provide leverage for a settlement with a local government that is 
concerned about attorneys’ fees, costs, and the risk of a considerable 
	
33. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (“The ordinance is assailed 
on the grounds that it is in derogation of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
in that it deprives appellee of liberty and property without due process of law and denies it the equal 
protection of the law, and that it offends against certain provisions of the Constitution of the State of 
Ohio.”); see also Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 119–20 (1928)); 
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 605 (1927); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 325-26 (1927). In 
the fifth of the early zoning cases decided by the Supreme Court, even though the Court opinion focused 
on due process, the landowner did bring an equal protection claim as well. See Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 619 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (“The contention of the plaintiff 
is that the zoning ordinance as to the locus is unreasonable, an indefensible invasion of his rights, 
deprives him of the equal protection of the laws, and takes his property without due process of law.”).  
34. That is, cases that do not involve, for example, free speech and family associational rights. 
See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981) (“Here, the Borough totally excludes 
all live entertainment, including nonobscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the First 
Amendment.”); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“When a 
city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, . . . the usual judicial deference to the legislature 
is inappropriate.”). 
35. 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). 
36. Id. at 565. 
37. Id. at 563. 












damages award), 40 it has not yielded a rich harvest of decisions in which 
landowners have prevailed. One reason for this record of futility is the 
adoption by several lower federal courts of a specific requirement that the 
plaintiff show ill will or personal animus in order to prevail.41 Moreover, 
many plaintiffs find it difficult to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction that 
they are being treated worse than other landowners whose situations are 
truly comparable.42 Still, the Equal Protection Clause provides protection 
for landowners who are the victims of arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, 
and retributive government regulators. 
Counsel representing disgruntled landowners have long been frustrated 
by the reality that, as Charles Haar and I pointed out two decades ago, “the 
United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained the proposition 
that there is no fundamental constitutional right to the speculative value of 
a piece of property.”43 That is one reason why so many attorneys, judges, 
and commentators have found the Roberge misquotation—asserting that the 
property owner’s “right . . . to devote its land to any legitimate use is 
property within the protection of the Constitution” 44 —so appealing. 
According to this misreading, as long as the landowner’s proposed (more 
profitable) use is not illegal or otherwise illegitimate, the government may 
well have deprived the landowner of a discrete property interest without due 
process or have taken (in whole or in part) a discrete private property interest 
from the owner without paying just compensation. And when one considers 
that the Takings Clause has been the go-to Clause for zealous advocates 
	
40. William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 494 (2007) (“Olech’s most noticeable practical effect may well turn out to be the 
increased litigation leverage enjoyed by plaintiffs, as Olech allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to 
dismiss without having to plead anything more than irrational government action.”). 
41. See, e.g., Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, 
and Judicial Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 206 (2013) 
(footnotes omitted) (“[D]ecisions in the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also held 
that animus or impermissible motive is an element of the class-of-one cause of action that must be 
pleaded to state a prima facie claim.”). 
42. See id. at 211 (“Numerous courts have concluded that a claim fails on its face because the 
plaintiff has failed to allege that others are similarly situated with a requisite degree of precision.”); see 
also Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. 122, 162 (2016) (footnote omitted) (“In determining 
whether an individual ‘has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,’ a court must define a class of similarly situated 
comparators and must assess the rationality of treatment.”). 
43. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive 
Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2158 (2002). See id. at 2159 (footnote omitted) (“Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. is the case most closely identified with the denial of a constitutional right 
to speculative value.”). See, e,g,, Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 
602, 645 (1993) (“[O]ur cases have long established that mere diminution in the value of property, 
however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (approximately 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 
U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (92.5% diminution).”).  











targeting statutes, ordinances, and regulations designed to protect 
environmentally sensitive lands and to address the causes and impacts of 
climate change,45 there is potentially a lot riding on a simple error.  
II. ROBERGE AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH 
Roberge was the last of a spate of zoning cases decided by the Court 
between 1926 and 1928. The first, and certainly most influential, ruling 
came in Justice Sutherland’s opinion for a six-member majority in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.46 In this landmark 1926 decision, the 
Court protected a Cleveland suburb’s comprehensive scheme of height, 
area, and use classifications from a facial constitutional challenge based on 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.47 Fewer than five months 
later, in Zahn v. Public Works,48 Justice Sutherland, for a unanimous Court, 
rejected a challenge to an ordinance dividing Los Angeles into five use 
zones.49 Two weeks after Zahn, the unanimous Court in Gorieb v. Fox,50 
again thanks to Sutherland, rejected a claim that a Roanoke, Virginia 
ordinance prescribing setbacks in a residential district violated due process 
and equal protection rights.51  
Justice Sutherland’s streak remained intact one year later in Nectow v. 
Cambridge, 52  when, again writing for the entire Court, he ruled for a 
landowner who owned property located in an industrial and commercial 
area that city officials had zoned for residential use.53 This facial Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge succeeded because, relying on the findings of a 
special master for the court below, Sutherland concluded that “the invasion 
of the property of [Nectow] was serious and highly injurious.”54 The Court’s 
final word on the legitimacy of zoning controls, at least until the early 
	
45. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Supreme Court Roadblocks to Responsive Coastal 
Management in the Wake of Lucas, 53 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 59, 82–83 (2018) (“[T]he use of the 
Takings Clause to attack allegedly confiscatory regulation of coastal and other environmentally sensitive 
land remains a popular and occasionally effective litigation strategy.”). For a compelling account of a 
rare and consequential victory for environmentalists in the Roberts Court, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, 
THE RULE OF FIVE: MAKING CLIMATE HISTORY AT THE SUPREME COURT (2020) (detailing the story of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).   
46. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
47. See id. at 397. See generally MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. 
AMBLER (2008). 
48. 274 U.S. 325 (1927). 
49. See id. at 327–28. 
50. 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
51. See id. at 605–10. 
52. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
53. For fascinating details on this case, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE 
ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 69–128 (2015). 











1960s,55 was set in motion by the conflict between an unusual element of 
Seattle, Washington’s first zoning ordinance and an ambitious philanthropic 
effort. 
A. Zoning Comes to Seattle 
The document that triggered the events culminating in the Court’s ruling 
in Roberge was the will of Caroline Kline Galland, the terms of which 
formed the lead story on the front page of the Seattle Daily Times for 
February 16, 1907: “Million and a Half for Charity: Mrs. Kline-Galland So 
Bequeaths Her Entire Estate.”56  The last of five subtitles—“Will Build 
Home for Sick and Destitute” 57 —highlighted the chief beneficiary of 
Galland’s celebrated generosity. She named the Seattle Trust and Title 
Company (“Seattle Trust”) as trustee, with instructions to use “[t]he greater 
part of the estate . . . to purchase a site, in or near Seattle, and the erection 
thereon of an institution to be known as the Caroline Kline Galland Home 
for the Aged and Feeble Poor.”58 The Galland Home would provide services 
“for those of the Jewish faith and for those who are members of that 
denomination known as the Society of Universal Religion.”59 
Seven years later, Seattle Trust purchased “Wildwood,” a five-acre 
parcel with frontage on Lake Washington, with plans to begin construction 
of a $150,000 structure for the Galland Home.60 A small building was 
completed in the summer of 1916, but, the Times reported, “completion of 
the main building of the home must be held in abeyance until it is possible 
to realize on some of the assets of the estate.”61 The postponement of the 
larger structure, owing to “[d]elay in the settlement of the estate62 and in the 
sale of real estate, the disposal of which was needed to provide funds for the 
	
55. Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding application of 
town’s ordinance regulating mining excavations to company operating as a nonconforming use under 
existing zoning ordinance). 
56. SEATTLE DAILY TIMES, Feb. 16, 1907, at 1. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. The will provided that  
there shall be admitted to it all aged and feeble Jewish men and women, as well also as aged 
and feeble men and women of or in accord with the belief recognized by the Society of 
Universal Religion, that may apply. It being my intention to have those occupy the Home who 
are in harmony upon religious creeds. 
Transcript of Record at 20, Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (No. 29) 
(testimony of Henry J. Hudson, Trust Officer of Seattle Trust) (quoting will of Caroline Kline Galland) 
[hereinafter Roberge Transcript of Record]. 
60. Site Bought for Home for Aged, SEATTLE SUNDAY TIMES, July 19, 1914, at 22. 
61. Kline-Galland Home for Poor Will Open at Wildwood July 1, SEATTLE SUNDAY TIMES, June 
25, 1916, at 22. 
62. Id. See Kline v. Galland, 102 P. 440, 442–43 (Wash. 1909) (affirming dismissal on grounds 











erection of buildings,”63  would prove problematic for Seattle Trust and 
supporters of the Galland Home. By the time the estate was ready to move 
forward, a new legal obstacle stood in its path. 
Like their counterparts in many municipalities in the opening decades of 
the twentieth century, Seattle officials had a keen interest in zoning. The 
city council adopted an ordinance in 1920 “relating to and establishing a 
City Zoning Commission and defining its powers and duties.”64 Following 
studies, the preparation of maps, and public hearings, the City Council 
enacted Seattle’s first zoning ordinance in 1923. 65  The Galland Home 
property was placed in a First Residence District “for the reason” according 
to E.L. Gaines, Executive Secretary of the City Planning Commission, “that 
the existing buildings in the district are practically all first class residences, 
with ideal surroundings for home life.”66 While single-family dwellings, 
public schools, certain private schools, churches, parks, playgrounds, art 
galleries, library buildings, conservatories, and railroad and shelter stations 
were permitted as of right in this district, the same could not be said for a 
“philanthropic home for children or for old people.”67 Facilities such as the 
Galland Home would only be “permitted in First Residence District when 
the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of 
the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building.”68 
The Galland Home could not secure neighbors’ consent for reasons that 
remain unclear. Some clues can be found within the documents comprising 
the Supreme Court’s Transcript of Record.69 Henry F. Dailey, a defense 
witness who lived in Seattle’s Mount Baker Park District (a few miles from 
the Galland Home), noted that “[t]he location of a home similar to this 
Galland Home has a very detrimental effect on the surrounding property”70: 
It breaks the harmony in a neighborhood. Now, you take that 
Home,—while we all think a great deal of the old people, and we like 
to see them taken care of,—nobody thinks more of old people than I 
do,—at the same time, we do not like in our home neighborhood,—
in our homes,—to have those people,—any great number of them 
constantly before us, every time you look out and every time you turn 
a corner you meet them, and they are objectionable to a certain extent 
	
63. Kline-Galland Home for Poor Will Open at Wildwood July 1, supra note 61. 
64. Roberge Transcript of Record, supra note 59, at 13 (affidavit of E.L. Gaines). 
65. See id. at 14 (affidavit of E.L. Gaines). 
66. Id. (affidavit of E.L. Gaines). 
67. Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 118 (1928) (quoting 1923 Seattle 
zoning ordinance). 
68. Id. 
69. Roberge Transcript of Record, supra note 59. 











in a neighborhood for this reason, and they are apt to mingle with the 
little children.71 
Despite his experience in the “general real estate business,” 72  Bailey’s 
explanation sounded, to be kind, very subjective. 
The second clue appears in the trial judge’s statement before issuing his 
ruling. In the oral decision announced on July 27, 1926, Judge James B. 
Kinne of the Superior Court of King County 73  took time to reject an 
insinuation of religious prejudice: “At one point in the argument, counsel 
for the plaintiff in this case referred to the fact that perhaps there was 
prejudice in the case for the reason that this home was created for Jewish 
people. Whatever foundation there is for that does not appear in the 
evidence.”74 Because he could not “find that the zoning ordinance is so 
clearly oppressive and unreasonable to justify me in granting the relief 
prayed for,”75 Judge Kinne ruled in favor of the city. 
Between the trial court’s decision and that of the Supreme Court of 
Washington on June 8, 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court had placed its seal of 
approval on comprehensive height, area, and use zoning in Euclid.76 In 
affirming the lower court’s ruling, the state high court cited and quoted 
generously from Euclid, offering this a fortiori reasoning: “In [Euclid] the 
court specifically upheld the provisions of the ordinance in question, 
prohibiting apartment houses in the residential district. We think it must be 
readily conceded that an apartment house would be far more desirable than 
a charitable institution in a residential district.”77 
Echoing Judge Kinne, the state supreme court majority confirmed that 
“the ordinance as drawn and applied is not unreasonable nor arbitrary.”78 
On October 26, 1927, Washington Chief Justice Kenneth Mackintosh 
granted the plaintiff’s petition for writ of error,79 and three days later Chief 
Justice Taft directed the Washington state courts to forward the record and 
proceedings to the Supreme Court.80 
	
71. Id. (citation omitted) (trial court testimony of Henry F. Dailey). 
72. Id. at 67 (trial court testimony of Henry F. Dailey). 
73. Id. at 18. 
74. Id. at 72 (oral decision of trial court). 
75. Id. at 74. 
76. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
77. State ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 256 P. 781, 783 (Wash. 1927) (en banc), rev’d, 
278 U.S. 116 (1928). The court noted that the “relator has frankly conceded that the vast majority of 
courts have upheld zoning ordinances, and the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. has set at rest the question of the right of cities to enact such 
legislation.” Id. at 782 (citation omitted). 
78. Id. at 784. 
79. Roberge Transcript of Record, supra note 59, at 88–89 (Order Granting Writ of Error). 











B. Justice Butler Writes for the Court 
In the Brief of Plaintiff in Error, the trustee’s counsel posed a longwinded 
question to the Court: 
[W]hether it is a violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for a municipal corporation to forbid the erection of a 
building for the comfortable housing of some 30 aged persons upon 
a five-acre tract of land in every way ideally fitted for such a purpose 
and dedicated thereto by over ten years of prior use, where there is 
no claim that such use is inimical to the morality, health, peace, good 
order or general welfare of the community, the only objection 
brought against the home being that its immediate neighbors do not 
like to have a number of aged persons so near and that the home 
exercises a depressing influence upon the neighbors and affects the 
value of the surrounding property.81 
The trustee seemed to have a good chance of prevailing, since the Court had 
rendered a landowner-friendly decision in the Nectow case only a few 
months before.82 
In his brief, counsel for George W. Roberge, the city’s Superintendent 
of Buildings, noted that, though at first the zoning ordinance prohibited 
homes for the elderly outright, city officials added the neighborhood 
approval option “strangely enough at the express request of the plaintiff in 
error!” 83  The defendant disagreed with the plaintiff's allegations of 
unconstitutionality: 
[W]e . . . emphatically state that it is our contention that the new and 
enlarged institution . . . is inimicable to the health, peace, good order 
	
81. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 7–8, Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 
(1928) (No. 29). 
82. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
83. Brief of Defendant in Error at 4, Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 
(1928) (No. 29) [hereinafter Roberge Defendant in Error Brief]. The following exchange between 
plaintiff's counsel and Gaines occurred during cross-examination: 
Q. Originally, this ordinance prohibited such homes as this in any first residence district, didn't 
it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then an application was made by the Trust Company for a modification of the ordinance, 
permitting a reclassification, so as to enable them to build this home. That is correct, is it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After that application was made, then on the recommendation of the Zoning Commission, 
there was an amendment made to the first residence district provision, was there not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that amendment was to the effect that you should secure the consent of two-third- [sic] 
of the property owners within a distance of four hundred feet of the proposed building? 











and general welfare of the community. The entire zoning ordinance 
is based on police power considerations and the regulation of the 
location of philanthropic and eleemosynary institutions in First 
Residence Districts is no exception.84 
While the bulk of the defendant’s brief focused on the legitimacy of zoning 
as a police power regulation, in one small section counsel indicated that the 
consent provision was not a problem: “Neither can it be said, indeed it is not 
contended, that the ordinance is unreasonable or invalid because it provides 
that such an institution may be permitted when the written consent has been 
obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred 
feet of the proposed building.”85 As it turned out, the consent provision 
proved to be the Achilles heel of Seattle’s otherwise sound zoning 
ordinance. 
Would the Court continue to speak with one voice, as it also had in 
Nectow, or would the dispute over the Galland Home rekindle the division 
between those Justices comfortable with police power regulations designed 
to protect the public good and those dedicated to safeguarding cherished 
private property rights? According to Justice Stone’s docket book entry for 
Roberge, 86  at the Justices’ conference following oral argument, a bare 
majority of five voted to reverse the holding of the court below. (See Figure 
2 below.) 
	
Roberge Transcript of Record, supra note 59, at 62 (citation omitted) (cross-examination of E.L. 
Gaines).  
84. Roberge Defendant in Error Brief, supra note 83, at 8. 
85. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
86. The author is most grateful to Professor Robert Post, the preeminent historian of the Taft 














Thanks to Chief Justice Stone’s decision to preserve his Court papers, 
we can gain a valuable insight into why the unanimous streak remained 
intact in Roberge. In a memorandum to then-Associate Justice Stone dated 
November 8, 1928, eleven days before the Court issued its decision, Justice 
Butler hoped “to help remove [Stone's] doubts” about the opinion. In the 











Euclid ruling, indicated a willingness to move beyond the Court's finding 
there that comprehensive zoning was not unconstitutional: 
I think, following the Nectow case and consistently with the Euclid 
case and the later zoning cases, it may be held that the State or 
municipality is without power to exclude the proposed home. In order 
to avoid any possibility of impairing the zoning decisions—and I did 
not agree with the first one—I think it better to let the decision rest 
upon the ground stated in the opinion.87 
That ground was not the broad question of the overall legitimacy of zoning, 
but a narrower issue: the invalidity of the two-thirds approval provision. 
After describing the subject property and expansion plans, Justice Butler 
provided details regarding Seattle’s First Residence District, quoting the 
specific language and including the controversial two-thirds approval 
provision in the opinion’s sole footnote.88 After noting that “[t]he trustee 
concedes that our recent decisions require that in its general scope the 
ordinance be held valid,”89 the opinion then asked the key question: “Is the 
delegation of power to owners of adjoining land to make inoperative the 
permission, given by § 3 (c) as amended,90 repugnant to the due process 
clause? Zoning measures must find their justification in the police power 
exerted in the interest of the public.”91 
Nectow cautioned that the power to zone “‘is not unlimited, and other 
questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.’” 92  Several other Supreme Court decisions, none of which 
concerned the regulation of real property, provided that “[l]egislatures may 
not, under the guise of the police power impose restrictions that are 
	
87. Memorandum from Pierce Butler, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, to Harlan F. Stone, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 3 (Nov. 8, 1928) 
[hereinafter Butler Memorandum]; see David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. 
L. REV. 695, 733 n.279 (2009) (noting that “Butler was such a strong adherent to the principle of stare 
decisis that he even advocated in favor of it when it would contradict his dissent in another case”). 
88. Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title & Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 118 n.* (1928). 
89. Id. at 120 (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Goreib v. Fox, 274 
U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); and Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
90. Section 3(c) of the Seattle zoning ordinance read, in pertinent part, “A philanthropic home 
for children or for old people shall be permitted in First Residence District when the written consent 
shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of 
the proposed building.” Roberge, 278 U.S. at 118. 
91. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120–21 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387). 











unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the 
pursuit of useful activities.”93 
In the crucial paragraph that followed this review of constitutional 
guideposts, Justice Butler contrasted the sensible decision to include 
compatible uses such as the Galland Home in the First Residence District, 
with the potentially “uncontrolled” exercise of veto power by neighboring 
landowners: 
The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is 
properly within the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed 
by the record make it clear that the exclusion of the new home from 
the first district is not indispensable to the general zoning plan. And 
there is no legislative determination that the proposed building and 
use would be inconsistent with public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare. . . . The section purports to give the owners of less 
than one-half the land within 400 feet of the proposed building 
authority—uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by 
legislative action—to prevent the trustee from using its land for the 
proposed home. The superintendent is bound by the decision or 
inaction of such owners. There is no provision for review under the 
ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound 
by any official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish 
reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee to their will or 
caprice. The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 
Because the zoning ordinance did not exclude homes for the elderly from 
the First Residence Zone, it was accurate to state that the trustee’s use of the 
parcel for an expanded Galland Home was a “legitimate use” of its land. 
Those making legitimate uses of their land are “properly within the 
	
93. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121 (citing Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 442 (1927) 
(invaliding state statute forbidding sale of tickets for more than fifty cents over face value), overruled 
by Olsen v. Nebraska, ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)); Weaver v. Palmer 
Brothers Co., 270 U.S. 402, 412, 415 (1926) (invalidating state statute prohibiting use of “shoddy” in 
bedcovers); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (enjoining enforcement of state 
statute requiring public school attendance); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 265 U.S. 70, 
74 (1924) (upholding order of state public service commission requiring railroad to provide suitable 
crossing with reasonable facilities for shippers); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 
(1924) (invalidating state consumer protection statute that fixed maximum and minimum weights for 
loaves of bread); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (invalidating state statute 
prohibiting teaching of languages other than English to young schoolchildren); Adams v. Tanner, 244 
U.S. 590, 594 (1917) (invalidating state law making it unlawful for employment agents to demand or 
receive fees from those seeking jobs), overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)); Lawton 
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (upholding state statute allowing officials to destroy illegal fishing 
nets). 











protection of the Constitution” generally. The pejoratives that color Justice 
Butler's description of the two-thirds consent provision—“uncontrolled,” 
“selfish,” “arbitrarily,” “caprice”—scream invalidity.  
The succeeding paragraph accentuated the Court’s focus on the suspect 
consent provision. Justice Butler distinguished the disapproval of 
neighboring landowners’ veto of a reasonable, compatible use from the 
Court’s decision in Thomas Cusack Company v. City of Chicago95 to uphold 
“an ordinance prohibiting the putting up of any billboard in a residential 
district without the consent of owners of a majority of the frontage on both 
sides of the street in the block where the board was to be erected.”96 In 
Cusack, the proposed use was much more deleterious: “The facts found 
were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such billboards would or were 
liable to endanger the safety and decency of such districts. It is not suggested 
that the proposed new home for aged poor would be a nuisance.” 97 
Apparently, Justice Butler was not swayed by the testimony regarding 
negative effects encounters with the elderly would have on children.  
Roberge did not expand the scope of private property rights. The Justices 
assumed that, because homes for the elderly were included in the First 
Residence District (albeit subject to an invalid consent provision), the 
expansion of the Galland Home was a “legitimate use.” In response to 
Justice Stone’s concerns, Justice Butler explained, “In the case before us, 
the prohibition would be against the common right of owners to devote their 
lands to legitimate use.”98 The proposed Galland Home “is legitimate and is 
not a menace such as bill boards were found to be”99 in Cusack. Moreover, 
“[n]othing in the record indicates that the home would injure or annoy 
anyone,” and, perhaps most importantly, “[t]he legislative determination is 
in favor of the project.”100 Grasping the import of these words is crucial to 
understanding what Justice Butler meant by “legitimate use,” as he 
distinguished use of the property as a home for the elderly (legitimate) from 
nuisance-like activities or activities that had not gained the approval of 
government regulators. Justice Butler emphasized that “surely it cannot be 
inferred that the city council found that such a home would be contrary to 
the public safety, health, morals or general welfare and at the same time 
authorized private individuals to permit it.”101 Here, the phrase “legitimate 
use” means use of property as authorized by the government. 
	
95. 242 U.S. 526 (1917). 
96. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 122. 
97. Id. at 122 (citation omitted). 














Justice Butler, no fan of zoning, explained, “[w]e need not decide 
whether, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, it is within the 
power of the State or municipality by a general zoning law to exclude the 
proposed new home from a district defined as is the first district in the 
ordinance under consideration.”102 The key to the Roberge holding was the 
improper “delegation of legislative power,”103 and the main legacy of the 
decision should have been subsequent challenges to other consent 
provisions that gave private parties veto power over development plans. 
However, a curious thing happened when the opinion was first released that 
complicated and confused Roberge’s legacy. 
C. The Improper T Appears in Print 
The Roberge slip opinion (see Figure 3 below), released on or soon after 
November 19, 1928,104 contained a simple, though ultimately profound, 
typographical error105 in the first sentence on page 5: “The right of the 
trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the 
protection of the Constitution.”106 If another letter of the word “properly” 
had been printed incorrectly, such as “properry,” the mistake would have 
been evident to any close reader. However, as luck (or an evil printer’s 
devil) would have it, the substitution of an improper t for the proper l 
resulted in (1) an actual word, that (2) made sense in the context of a key 
sentence, while (3) altering the substantive meaning. 
The error was corrected by the time the U.S. Government Printing Office 
published the Preliminary Print in 1929 (see Figure 4 below).107 Volume 
	
102. Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 123 (1928). 
103. Butler Memorandum, supra note 87, at 2. 
104. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 553 (“[N]o later than the early twentieth century, the Court was 
regularly releasing copies of is opinions within a few days of the opinions’ announcements.”). 
Roberge was one of eleven decisions announced that day, comprising two percent of the 825 cases 
decided during the October 1928 Term, in sharp contrast with the 63 cases that merited opinions during 
the October 2019 Term. Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1928-29, CQ PRESS, 
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1929061000 
[https://perma.cc/MFA5-4T6P]; Opinions of the Court - 2019, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/19 [https://perma.cc/27EY-KUSU]. For the 
decision rating top billing, see High Court Upholds New York Klan Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1928, at 
1 (discussing N.Y. ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928)). 
105. It is possible, though less likely, that the mistake was in the draft of the opinion that Justice 
Butler submitted to the printer and that Butler or someone else familiar with what Butler intended noted 
the mistake upon reading the slip opinion. For details on the Court’s process for correcting these kinds 
of errors, see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 562–63 nn.111, 113. 
106. Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, No. 29, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1928) 
(emphasis added). 
107. Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928) (Preliminary Print); 
see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 554  (“The 1922 legislation expressly provided for GPO’s publication of 











278 of the United States Reports, appearing later that same year, included 
the correction as well.108 However, in the interim between the release of the 
slip opinion and the Preliminary Print, the two most important private 
publishers of Supreme Court opinions—West Publishing Company 
(Supreme Court Reports) and the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 
Company (Lawyers’ Edition)—had released versions of the case featuring 
the error.109 
 
             Figure 3                                                               Figure 4  
                                  
 
How do we know that the mistake was made in the slip opinion and not 
in the Preliminary Print and the United States Reports? A Supreme Court 
research librarian provided this answer: 
[O]ur Reporter’s Office received material from the National Archives 
and looked into their records including the slip opinion released in 
the case, the Preliminary Print and the U.S. Reports opinion. It is 
their conclusion that the word “property” at issue in the fifth 
paragraph which appears in the slip opinion was later corrected.  It 
was common practice at that time to edit the text after the slip opinion 
was released.  The later Preliminary Print of the U.S. Reports shows 
the word changed to “properly.”  It remained corrected in the final 
U.S. Reports opinion.  The [Supreme Court] Reporter’s Office also 
said that the change from “property” to “properly” was clearly 
intended.  The hot lead type print process meant that a change had to 
be deliberately zeroed in on and then that part of the opinion had to 
be reset.  In other words, it couldn’t be an inadvertent typographical 
error.110  
Two seeds were thus planted by different versions of the Roberge opinion, 
yielding a diversified harvest of citations. Things quickly became 
complicated. 
	
statute referred to as ‘advance copies’ of opinions in ‘pamphlet installments.’” (citing Act of July 1, 
1922, Pub. L. 67-272, §§ 1, 4, 42 Stat. 816, 816, 818)). 
108. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121. 
109. See Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 49 S. Ct. 50, 52, 73 L. Ed. 210, 213 (1928); 
see also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 553–54 (“Private companies published both those original opinions 
and, later on, the final opinions appearing in the bound United States Reports. The Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company began publishing Lawyers’ Edition in 1882, and West Publishing Company 
commenced publishing its competing Supreme Court Reporter one year later in 1883.”). 
110. E-mail from Catherine R. Romano, Research Librarian, Supreme Court of the United States, 











D. The Replication Begins: No Harm, No Foul 
Soon after the release of the Roberge slip opinion, commentators and 
courts repeated the error. Luckily, these early authorities did not place any 
special substantive emphasis on the improper t. 
The February 1929, issue of Notre Dame Lawyer featured in its “Notes 
on Recent Cases” section a summary of Roberge by D.M. Donahue.111 
While the discussion of the holding paraphrased Justice Butler’s words, 
Donahue chose to replicate verbatim (though without quotation marks) the 
sentence with the error.112 The major focus of Donahue’s discussion, like 
Justice Butler’s, was on the improper delegation.113 
Similarly, a summary in the American Bar Association Journal written 
by the editor-in-chief, Edgar Bronson Tolman, quoted generously from the 
Court’s opinion, including the improper t.114 The former President of the 
Illinois State Bar Association,115 Tolman did not compound the error by 
placing any special emphasis on the word “property.” 
This pattern was repeated on December 20, 1929, when the Supreme 
Court of Illinois announced its ruling in Spies v. Board of Appeals.116 Albert 
P. Spies’s plans to build a store in an “A” residential zone in Decatur were 
frustrated by an approval scheme similar to that invalidated in Roberge:  
[T]he zoning ordinance did not permit a store building to be erected 
in that district without the written consent of the owners of seventy-
five per cent of the property within a radius of 300 feet of the 
proposed building, and the application for the permit was not 
accompanied by such written consent.117 
Before ruling in favor of the landowner, Justice Frank K. Dunn explained 
that this was neither a frontal assault on the zoning ordinance nor the 
assertion of a yet-unrecognized property right: 
This case does not involve the constitutionality of the Zoning law or 
of this particular ordinance except in respect to the one paragraph of 
section 3 which compels the appellant to hold the right, essential to 
the free and complete enjoyment of his property, of establishing and 
	
111. D.M. Donahue, Note, Constitutional Law—Zoning Ordinances Must Find Their Justification 
in Police Power Exerted in the Interest of the Public, 4 NOTRE DAME LAW. 334, 334–35 (1929).  
112. Id. at 335. 
113. See id. 
114. See Edgar Bronson Tolman, Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 15 A.B.A. J. 26, 28 
(1929). 
115. Past ISBA Presidents, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.isba.org/leadership/pastpresidents [https://perma.cc/UH2D-X665]. 
116. 169 N.E. 220 (Ill. 1929). 











erecting on it a community store subject to the arbitrary, uncontrolled 
will of the owners of neighboring property.118 
Justice Dunn summarized and quoted extensively from Roberge, 
including the improper t.119 As for Justice Butler’s statement that “[t]he 
delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” Justice Dunn commented: “This language is 
perfectly applicable mutatis mutandis to the present case.”120 Following a 
review of Illinois decisions concerning problematic consent provisions, the 
Spies court concluded that Roberge was “decisive that the ordinance of the 
city of Decatur is repugnant to the constitutional prohibition of deprivation 
of property without due process of law.”121 
These early examples were harmless errors. Before too long, judges, 
advocates, and commentators would read much more into a seemingly 
insignificant mistake.  
III. TWO STREAMS DIVERGE 
Since the late 1920s, hundreds of judges, commentators, attorneys, and 
other writers have cited or quoted Roberge. Not surprisingly, given the 
major focus of the ruling, most citations and quotations concern the 
legitimacy of a delegation of power to nongovernmental actors. A 
Shepard’s search yielded 341 cases citing Roberge, 212 of which discuss 
the legality of delegation, with 432 out of 679 total references discussing 
the topic. The numbers for a similar search using Westlaw identified 243 
out of 327 cases, and 840 out of 1,243 total references. 
Included among these delegation cases are a few Supreme Court 
opinions. A notable example is City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc.,122 in which the Court answered “no” to the question of “whether a city 
charter provision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% 
of the votes cast violates the due process rights of a landowner who applies 
for a zoning change.” 123  Chief Justice Burger explained that “the 
standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners 
condemned by the Court in Eubank [v. Richmond]124 and Roberge is not to 
	
118. Id. at 221. 
119. See id. (“The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is property [sic] 
within the protection of the [C]onstitution.”). 
120. Id. at 222 (quoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928)) 
(italics added). 
121. Spies, 169 N.E. at 222. 
122. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). 
123. Id. at 670. 
124. 226 U.S. 137, 140 (1912) (invalidating a provision allowing two-thirds of property owners 











be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referendum 
process.”125 The Justices also invoked Roberge in other delegation cases 
not involving land use regulation, 126  and in cases in which improper 
delegation was not at issue.127 The same rough division of delegation- and 
non-delegation-related cases appears in hundreds of state and lower federal 
court opinions, some of which were reviewed, or decided on remand by, the 
Court,128 as well as in a larger number of other sources such as briefs,129 law 
review articles,130 and treatises.131 
Because the judges and lawyers writing the overwhelming majority of 
these opinions and other materials did not quote the Roberge language 
	
125. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 678.  
126. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272 n.22 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)  (“[W]e 
have indicated that due process places limits on the manner and extent to which a state legislature may 
delegate to others powers which the legislature might admittedly exercise itself.”), reh’g granted and 
vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1939) (“This is not a case . . . 
where a prohibition of an inoffensive and legitimate use of property is imposed not by the legislature 
but by other property owners . . . .”); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 
183, 194 (1936) (“We find nothing in this situation to justify the contention that there is an unlawful 
delegation of power to private persons to control the disposition of the property of others . . . .”); Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311–12 (1936) (“The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly 
a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary 
to do more than refer to decisions of this court which foreclose the question.”). 
127. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 735 
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“And this Court has long recognized that property regulations can be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause.”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932) 
(“And it is plain that unreasonable or arbitrary interference or restrictions cannot be saved from the 
condemnation of that [Fourteenth] Amendment merely by calling them experimental.”). 
128. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“Government enforcement power did not save . . . the power of private landowners in [Roberge] to 
impose a zoning restriction on a neighbor's tract of land.”), vacated, 575 U.S. 43 (2015); First Eng. 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 900 n.8 (1989) (noting that “two 
opinions of [the Euclid v. Ambler] era [Roberge and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)] 
disapproved specific provisions not remotely resembling the instant ordinance and its public safety 
concerns”), on remand from 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
129. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 16, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432 (1985) (No. 84-468), 1985 WL 668980, at *16 (“In zoning cases in particular, it is critical not 
to permit such stereotyped attitudes to prevail through deference to residents’ opinions.”); Brief for 
Appellees at 83, Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (No. 83-141), 1984 WL 987633, at 
*83 (“[D]ue process forbids the state from delegating absolute, standardless authority over the right to 
invoke its eminent domain power to private parties, who are neither legally nor politically accountable 
to those over whom they may exercise authority or to the public for the criteria that guide their 
decisions.”). 
130. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 
1499 & n.83 (2008) (“In one view, imposition of new restrictions by neighbors violates the landowners’ 
right to an impartial decisionmaker, as the neighbors might be directly interested in the restriction that 
they are imposing.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1438 
n.239 (2003) (“In two cases [Roberge and Eubank], both involving zoning ordinances that allowed 
property owners to impose restrictions on neighboring property, the delegations were struck down as 
violating due process.”).  
131. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW § 6.04 n.13 












regarding the right to devote one’s land “to any legitimate use,” these 
materials are outside the scope of this Article. The subset of cases and other 
materials citing Roberge that are most pertinent are those that quote (“any 
legitimate use is properly”) or misquote (“any legitimate use is property”) 
Justice Butler’s words. 
A. The “Properly” Authorities 
Scores of writers have quoted the “any legitimate use” sentence from 
Roberge in opinions, articles, books, briefs, motions, and oral argument to 
support assertions regarding the validity of a wide range of property 
regulations. Generalizing about the “properly” authorities, that is, those 
documents that correctly quote or cite Roberge, is difficult. In most 
instances the authority is either summarizing the holding or employing the 
language in support of a ruling or argument regarding the validity of a 
zoning or other land use mechanism. In contrast, many of the “property” 
authorities highlight the Roberge Court’s efforts to bolster private property 
rights. These authorities often push for an expansion of the nature of the 
“property” that is protected by the Due Process Clause beyond the land 
itself, to include a proffered fundamental right to governmental approval of 
land development. Examples drawn from both streams allows the reader to 
appreciate the real-world impact of a stray keystroke. 
Most of the fourteen reported opinions in which judges correctly quoted 
the “properly” language132 were routine challenges brought by landowners 
seeking to make more intensive use of property than permitted under the 
applicable zoning classification.133  While judges often cited Roberge in 
	
132. Richter v. City of Des Moines, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17191, at *6–7 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 
2013) (Ikuta, J., dissenting); Harris v. Cnty. of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990); Hardesty 
v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1026 (E.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hardesty v. Sacramento Cnty., 824 F. App’x 474 (9th Cir. 2020); Kamaole 
Pointe Dev. LP v. Cnty. of Maui, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96388, at *31 (D. Haw. Nov. 25, 2008); Wilson 
v. City of New Orleans, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1283, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2002); LaSalle Nat’l Bank 
v. Cnty. of DuPage, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3200, at *28 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1991); State ex rel. Henry 
v. Mia., 158 So. 82, 84 (Fla. 1934) (Davis, C.J., concurring); Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214, 221–22 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Watson v. Mayflower Prop., Inc., 177 So. 2d 355, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1965)); William Murray Builders, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1971) (citing Henry, 158 So. 82); Mayflower Prop., Inc., 177 So. 2d at 359 (quoting 35 FLA. JUR., Zoning 
Laws § 10); Burritt v. Harris, 166 So. 2d 168, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (Rawls, J., dissenting) 
(citing Henry, 158 So. 82), rev’d, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965); Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 308 
P.3d 88, 103, 109 (Mont. 2013) (Rice, J., dissenting, & McKinnon, J., dissenting); Forest City Enters., 
Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Ohio 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Smith v. Troy, 
1934 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1002, at *10–11 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1934) (no source cited). 
133. Harris v. Cnty. of Riverside, 904 F.2d at 498 (“[Harris] claims that by rezoning his property 
as residential and imposing bureaucratic roadblocks to his ability to comply with County land use 
procedures, the County has taken his property in violation of his [F]ifth [A]mendment rights and violated 
his [F]ourteenth [A]mendment rights to procedural and substantive due process, including depriving him 











support of the allegedly victimized landowner, 134  sometimes the 
government prevailed.135 
Only a few of the “properly” opinions centered on (im)proper delegation 
of land use regulatory authority. The best example was the 1975 decision of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio in Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Eastlake, 136  which attempted to invalidate the city’s charter provision 
“provid[ing] that no ordinance changing land use becomes effective until 
ratified by 55 percent of the voters in a city-wide election.”137 As noted 
above, a year later the Supreme Court reversed this ruling.138 
	
equal protection, and substantive due process claims brought by landowner who was denied a planned 
unit development permit); Henry, 158 So. at 84 (Davis, C.J., concurring) (“Legislators may not, under 
the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary or unreasonable upon the use of 
private property or upon the pursuit of useful activities.”); Davis, 318 So. 2d at 221–22, 226 (affirming 
the lower court’s order to rezone property to allow for more density); William Murray, 254 So. 2d at 
366 (holding that agricultural designation was arbitrary and unreasonable); Watson, 177 So. 2d at 359 
(finding that residential zoning designation was arbitrary and unreasonable); Burritt, 166 So. 2d at 175 
(Rawls, J., dissenting) (“[P]laintiff has been deprived of the use of his property through the arbitrary fiat 
of the legislative body and such a confiscation of an individual’s property under the guise of the police 
power should not be allowed to stand.”); Smith, 1934 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1002, at *10–11 (unsuccessful 
attempt to operate a barbershop in a residential zone). 
134. See, e.g., Harris, 904 F.2d at 503 (“We must also determine whether the County’s decision 
deprived Harris of a protected property interest prior to applying procedural due process. We find that it 
did. ‘The right of [an owner] to devote [his] land to any legitimate use is properly within the protection 
of the Constitution.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 
278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928))). 
135. See, e.g., LaSalle, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3200, at *29 (“The plaintiffs have not offered a 
separate constitutional violation, but have merely restated the standard for substantive due process that 
is the theory of their case. Consequently, the plaintiffs have not fulfilled the Seventh Circuit’s 
requirement that a separate constitutional violation be alleged to support a substantive due process 
argument in a property context.”). 
136. 324 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). 
137. Id. at 743; see Henry, 158 So. at 83; see also Williams, 308 P.3d at 99 (“We agree with the 
District Court that the protest provision . . . which allows property owners representing 50 percent of the 
agricultural and forest land in a district to block zoning proposals, is an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.”). 











Much like in the case law, there are various reasons for including the 
“properly” language in articles,139 books,140 and briefs.141 Not surprisingly, 
most of the citations are in connection with discussions of the rights of 
property owners subject to zoning and other land use regulations. 
For example, in 2018 the Court of Appeals of Texas ruled against a 
business owner who claimed that the application of a zoning ordinance to 
his automobile repair business was illegally retroactive, a deprivation of 
property without due process of law, and an illegal taking.142 The court 
explained: 
When Hinga [Mbogo] purchased the property he knew “the rules” 
governing “the play,” meaning he knew operating an automotive 
repair shop on Ross Avenue was a nonconforming use. It was at his 
own risk that he continued investing money in the automotive 
business despite knowing his use was nonconforming and the City 
could establish a compliance date at any time.143 
Undaunted, Mbogo sought relief from the Supreme Court of Texas.  
	
139. See, e.g., David Della Porta, Procedural Due Process Under the District of Columbia 
Historic Preservation Act, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1107, 1109 n.15 (1984) (“While this interest in property 
is subject to the restrictions of the state's police power, courts have long recognized that any legitimate 
use is properly within the protection of the Constitution.”); Christopher R. Bryant, Comment, Zoning 
Out Due Process Rights: W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southampton, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 565, 
583–87 (1999) (discussing circuit split regarding whether landowners bringing due process claims need 
to show a “strict entitlement” to the relief sought); Kathryn A. Dunwoody, Note, Arnel Development 
Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners’ Due Process Rights, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1107, 1130 & 171 n.140 (1982) (“[I]t has seldom been questioned that landowners have due 
process rights where contemplated administrative action would curtail profitable use of their lands.”); 
Lawrence Geller, Note, Expiring Use Restrictions: Their Impact and Enforceability, 24 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 155, 172 & n.151 (1989) (discussion of Takings Clause in article discussing federal affordable 
housing legislation). 
140. See, e.g., 7 FLA. JUR. 2D, Building, Zoning, and Land Controls § 185 (2020) (citing Burritt 
v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965) and William Murray Builders, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)) (“The right of owners to devote their land to any legitimate use is properly 
within the terms of the United States Constitution, and the legislature may not, under the guise of the 
police power, impose unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions on that use.”).  
141. See, e.g., Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 22, Mbogo v. City of Dall., 2019 Tex. LEXIS 
880 (Aug. 30, 2019) (No. 18-0738), 2019 WL 1317801 (noting, in a zoning challenge, that “[t]he U.S. 
Supreme Court, this Court, and courts around the country have all recognized that property owners 
possess constitutionally protected interest in the use of land”); Plaintiff/Appellee, Hillcrest Property, 
L.L.P.’s Answer Brief at 34, Hillcrest Prop., L.L.P. v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2019) (No. 
17-14790), 2018 WL 1007904 (noting, in a challenge to a transportation corridor, that “[t]he United 
States Supreme Court likewise recognizes the fundamental nature of the rights at issue in this case”). 
142. See Mbogo v. City of Dall., No. 15-00879-CV, 2018 WL 3198398, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June 
29, 2018). 











The section of Mbogo’s brief on the merits asserting that “It Is Well-
Established That Property Owners Possess a Constitutionally Protected 
Vested Right in Continuing a Legitimate Use” opened by invoking Roberge: 
The U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, and courts around the country 
have all recognized that property owners possess constitutionally 
protected interest [sic] in the use of land. The federal courts have 
recognized this right for decades: “The right of the [property owner] 
to devote its land to any legitimate use is properly within the 
protection of the Constitution.”144 
The overwhelming majority of state high courts have approved the use of 
amortization periods to phase out nonconforming uses and buildings;145 the 
state high court declined to review the case.146  The position of Mbogo and 
other landowners aggrieved by arguably onerous regulations would have 
been stronger if only the Roberge Court had been even more aggressive in 
their protection of property rights—or if the Court had never corrected the 
improper t. 
B. The “Property” Authorities: Three Advantages for Property Owners 
What if the U.S. Supreme Court had actually ruled that a landowner’s 
right “to devote its land to any legitimate use” was “property within the 
protection of the Constitution”? Roberge was a challenge based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—“nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”147  Accordingly, as the owner denied permission to make a legitimate 
use of its property by building a more expansive Galland Home, Seattle 
Trust would have automatically satisfied the threshold requirement as one 
“deprive[d]” of “property.” The next step would then have been to 
determine if Seattle Trust had received “due process of law.”  
The first advantage of the “property” wording would have been that all 
owners seeking to make any legitimate use of property (that is, a use that is 
not “inconsistent with public health, safety, morals or general welfare”)148 
	
144. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 22, Mbogo v. City of Dall., 2019 Tex. LEXIS 880 (No. 
18-0738), 2019 WL 1317801 (alteration in original). 
145. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 131, at § 5.80. For the minority position, see id. at § 5.81; 
see also Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. 1991). 
146. Mbogo v. City of Dall., 2019 Tex. LEXIS 880, at *1 (Aug. 30, 2019). 
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Of course similar language appears in the Fifth Amendment, 
applicable to the federal government (“nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”). Id. amend. V. 











would meet the threshold, articulated in Board of Regents v. Roth,149 for 
bringing a procedural due process challenge. Mathews v. Eldridge 150 
instructs the courts to consider 
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.151 
Defendants typically meet procedural due process requirements by 
providing adequate and timely notice and a meaningful hearing.152 
The second advantage of the improper t would come in the area of 
substantive due process. Property owners have been frustrated for decades 
because of the predominant pattern of judicial deference to local and state 
lawmakers exercising police power authority. The stakes can be much 
higher for local governments whose zoning and other regulations of land 
reduce the value of property, because unlike states, cities, counties, and 
other political subdivisions are potentially subject to budget-busting 
damages under § 1983.153 A significant barrier facing landowners claiming 
that they have been deprived of their property by local governments without 
due process of law (that is, by arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable 
regulation) is the “entitlement rule,” derived from Justice Stewart’s 
statement in Roth: “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more 
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it.”154 There are dozens of reported decisions in which 
landowners and developers who unsuccessfully sought rezonings, special 
use permits, subdivision approval, and other forms of development 
permission have come up against this barrier, because judges viewed their 
cases as frustrations of desires rather than denials of entitlements.155 If, 
however, the right to make a (currently unpermitted) legitimate use of 
property were itself deemed “property” in a constitutional sense, the 
	
149. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, 
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”). 
150. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
151. Id. at 335. 
152. See id. at 348–49. 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
154. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). 











landowner could try to convince the court that it had been arbitrarily and 
unreasonably abused by land use regulators. 
The highly confusing realm of takings law is the setting for the third 
advantage of the “property” version. A developer denied a rezoning from, 
say, residential to commercial use has rarely if ever suffered a partial 
regulatory taking under the balancing approach of Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City,156 because the property still 
retains “reasonable beneficial use.”157 This developer will also be unable to 
demonstrate that it has been victimized by a government-compelled 
permanent physical occupation taking158 or that its property is devoid of all 
use or value à la Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.159 The improper 
t, however, would create an intriguing opportunity, because the Court has 
recognized that the total deprivation of one of the essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights collectively known as private property, if not accompanied 
by just compensation, can amount to a Takings Clause violation.160 That is, 
if a local government should totally destroy the developer’s right to make a 
legitimate use of its property, by denying a rezoning to a more intensive and 
lucrative use for which the property was suitable, a court could find that the 
developer was entitled to compensation (most likely the difference between 
the fair market value of the parcel zoned commercial versus residential).161 
Judges, commentators, and counsel have relied on the Roberge error to 
advance all three grounds upon which disgruntled landowners seek relief—
procedural due process, substantive due process, and takings. 
1. Opinions 
As illustrated in Figure 5 below, since 1929, fourteen reported federal 
and state cases have included opinions featuring the improper t. The cases 
originated in New England, the Midwest, and the South, including eight 
	
156. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
157. Id. at 138. 
158. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (“[W]here government 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—it must 
provide just compensation.”). 
159. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[T]there are good reasons for 
our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice 
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”). 
160. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“[T]he regulation here amounts to virtually 
the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property—the small undivided interest—to one’s 
heirs.”); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (“[T]he ‘right to exclude,’ 
so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of 
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.”) (footnote omitted). 
161. See, e.g., U.S. v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1984) (“The Fifth Amendment 
requires that the United States pay ‘just compensation’—normally measured by fair market value—











cases from federal and state courts in Florida. There are three generations 
of reported cases that include the error, beginning with the West Publishing 
and Lawyers Co-operative versions of Roberge, followed by nine cases 
directly quoting the improper t,162 two of which have spawned their own 
progeny (three cases from one, two from another).163 The latest reported 
decision appeared in January 2020.164 
 
Figure 5 
In a few opinions, the inclusion of the improper t is harmless error. In 
the earliest decision, for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Spies v. 
Board of Appeals,165  invalidated a provision requiring consent from 75 
percent of neighboring owners before the owner of a property in a 
residential zone could secure a permit to erect a store on the site.166 The 
court spent several paragraphs explaining the facts and reasoning of 
	
162. The opinions directly misquoting Roberge are as follows: Moore v. City of Tallahassee, 928 
F. Supp. 1140, 1145–46 (N.D. Fla. 1995); State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 128 So. 4, 7 (Fla. 1930); 
Burritt v. Harris, 166 So. 2d 168, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), rev’d, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965); Spies 
v. Bd. of Appeals, 169 N.E. 220, 221–22 (Ill. 1929); Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. UJ-Eighty Corp., 141 
N.E.3d 869, 876 (Ind. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, No. 19A-PL-457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); Thomas v. New 
Orleans Redevelopment Auth., 942 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Jackson v. McPherson, 138 
So. 604, 610 (Miss. 1932) (Ethridge, J., dissenting); Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. Garfield Heights, 
136 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council, 698 A.2d 202, 216 (R.I. 
1997) (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
163. The opinions misquoting Roberge through Du Bose are as follows: Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 
2d 820, 823 n.2 (Fla. 1965) (with citations to both cases); Orange Cnty. v. Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 655 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1979). 
The opinions misquoting Roberge through Moore are as follows: Collins & Co. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–43 (M.D. Fla 1998) (citing both cases); Richman Grp. of Fla., 
Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 2016 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 4713, at *27, 2016 WL 8376580, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
29, 2016), rev’d, 253 So. 3d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
164. UJ-Eighty Corp., 141 N.E.3d at 876. 
165. 169 N.E. 220 (Ill. 1929). See supra notes 116–121 and accompanying text. 











Roberge, and included a long quotation from the opinion, including the 
improper t.167 The Spies court concluded by noting that, because of the 
similarity of the two zoning provisions, Roberge was “decisive that the 
ordinance of the city of Decatur is repugnant to the constitutional 
prohibition of deprivation of property without due process of law.”168 
In similar fashion, the Court of Appeals of Indiana in 2020 characterized 
as an unconstitutional delegation a provision in the Bloomington zoning 
ordinance “that contained the definition of a fraternity or sorority house and 
required students to be enrolled in Indiana University and sanctioned by the 
university, through whatever process the university chose, as members of a 
fraternity or sorority.”169 The trial court had placed Roberge at the center of 
its analysis, and the appellate panel’s majority agreed: “After 
acknowledging ‘the right of the [landowner] to devote its land to any 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution,’ the 
Roberge Court struck down the ordinance.”170 The misquoted language was 
not necessary to the resolution of the case, which was decided on delegation 
grounds. 
In the other opinions featuring the improper t, judges have attempted to 
make it easier for property-owning plaintiffs to gain relief from procedural 
due process, substantive due process, or takings violations. 
a. Procedural Due Process 
The improper t appears in Thomas v. New Orleans Redevelopment 
Authority,171 in which the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in 2006 considered 
a procedural due process challenge brought by former owners of blighted 
property expropriated by public officials. The court, misquoting Roberge, 
found that the owners, who claimed that the notice provided by the 
Authority was deficient, “clearly have a protected property interest in 831-
33 Sixth Street, that is, the right to devote the property to any legitimate use. 
Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to constitutional procedural due process 
before NORA could deprive them of that property interest.” 172 
Nevertheless, because public officials “made all reasonable efforts to 
ascertain the plaintiffs’ respective addresses,”173 the court concluded that 
plaintiffs’ due process rights had not been violated. 
	
167. See id. at 221. 
168. Id. at 222. 
169. UJ-Eighty Corp., 141 N.E.3d at 870.  
170. Id. at 876 (alteration in original) (misquoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 
278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928)). 
171. 942 So. 2d 1163 (La. Ct. App. 2006).  












b. Substantive Due Process 
In 1930, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Helseth v. Du 
Bose,174 relied on the improper t to support a finding that a city’s zoning-
based denial of a building permit to a county wishing to build a jail was 
“arbitrary and unreasonable.” The court explained: 
The right of an owner to devote his land to any legitimate use is 
property within the terms of the Constitution, and the Legislature may 
not under the guise of the police power impose unnecessary or 
unreasonable restrictions upon such use. . . .   
In its general scope the ordinance under attack is not shown to be 
violative of the state or Federal Constitution. But, on the showing 
made here as to the lands of appellant, we think it is arbitrary and 
unreasonable.175 
The Du Bose court’s use of the improper t was in turn quoted in Boca Raton 
v. Boca Villas Corporation,176 in which the district court of appeal in 1979 
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the city’s attempt to control growth 
by capping the number of residential units was invalid.177   
The best example of a judge waxing poetic about fundamental private 
property rights while invoking the improper t is the dissenting opinion of 
Justice William N. Ethridge, Jr., of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in City 
of Jackson v. McPherson,178 a 1932 case in which the majority ruled that the 
owner of a lot zoned for residential use would not be able to secure a permit 
for a gasoline service center.  
Justice Ethridge could not resist the urge “to state a few fundamental 
principles underlying our system of government.”179 Invoking the letter and 
	
174. 128 So. 4, 7 (Fla. 1930). 
175. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). The Du Bose court’s language was cited as dictum in a Florida 
appellate case involving three cities desiring to build an airport that unsuccessfully claimed to be immune 
from the county’s zoning ordinance. Orange Cnty. v. Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1974) (“In holding that the application of the city zoning ordinance to the county property was arbitrary 
and unreasonable based on the facts of the case, the [DuBose] court noted the rule that the right of an 
owner to devote his land to any legitimate use is a property right which may not be unnecessarily or 
unreasonably restricted under guise of the police power.”). 
176. 371 So. 2d 154, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
177. The appellate court “affirm[ed] the trial court’s holding that the charter amendment and 
implementing ordinances bear no rational relationship to a valid municipal purpose.” Id. at 159. 
178. 138 So. 604 (Miss. 1932). 











spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Constitution of 
1776, he emphasized that  
[t]he use of property is the greatest thing concerning it. When a man 
acquires property he acquires the right to its use, and it is only when 
that use, whatever it may be, interferes with the rights of some other 
person that the government may restrain that use, and then only to the 
extent that it infringes upon public health, public morals, or the public 
safety.180 
Among several other cases in support of this proposition, Justice Etheridge 
proffered Roberge. In fact, he considered the improper t so nice that he used 
it twice: 
In [Roberge], the United States Court held . . . that the right to devote 
real estate to any legitimate use is property within the protection of 
the Constitution. . . . The court in the Roberge Case further said: 
“Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power impose 
restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of 
private property or the pursuit of useful activities. The right of the 
trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the 
protection of the Constitution.”181 
Evidently his colleagues in the majority were more cavalier when it came 
to the protection of fundamental property rights.182  
In 1964, the District Court of Appeal of Florida was faced with a 
landowner’s due process challenge brought because a county refused to 
rezone his property from residential to industrial use, costing him over 
$30,000 in potential value.183 Citing Roberge and two Florida decisions, the 
court acknowledged that “there are certain principles pertinent to the 
disposition of this appeal,” and noted that the first of those principles was 
that “the right of an owner to devote his land to any legitimate use is 
property within the terms of both the Federal and State Constitutions, and 
	
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 610 (Ethridge, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
182. In a 1997 decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Justice Robert Flanders asserted 
that subdivision developers whose plans were frustrated by an improper referendum had a 
constitutionally protected property interest even though they lacked permits. L.A. Ray Realty v. Town 
Council, 698 A.2d 202, 216 (R.I. 1997) (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(misquoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928)) (“[B]oth the trial 
justice and this court have held that the developer plaintiffs were deprived of a constitutionally protected 
property interest when the local governmental authorities arbitrarily and irrationally refused to award a 
permit for their residential subdivision plans. I believe this result accords with long-standing federal 
constitutional principles that recognize that ‘[t]he right of [an owner] to devote [his or her] land to any 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution.’”) (alterations in original). 
183. See Burritt v. Harris, 166 So. 2d 168, 170–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), rev’d, 172 So. 2d 











zoning authorities may not, under the guise of the police power, impose 
unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions upon such use.”184 Nevertheless, 
the court ruled against the landowner, concluding that he had “failed to carry 
the burden of showing that the character of his property has so changed as 
to make a refusal by the zoning Board to alter its zoning classification, 
confiscation of his property,” and had not “establish[ed] that the action of 
the appellees, acting as the Zoning Board, in continuing the residential-use 
character of his property, was, under the circumstances as reflected in the 
testimony and evidence before the chancellor, either arbitrary, unreasonable 
or discriminatory.”185 So far, the use of the improper t was harmless error. 
A year later, however, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, 
emphasizing nuisance-like negative externalities that negatively affected 
the parcel: “The uncontradicted testimony . . . shows the property to be 
unsuitable for residential use because of the noise from the airport and the 
obnoxious odor from a nearby pulp and paper plant.”186 In justifying its 
reversal of the two lower courts, the state high court, citing Roberge and Du 
Bose, paraphrased the idea represented by the improper t: “The 
constitutional right of the owner of property to make legitimate use of his 
lands may not be curtailed by unreasonable restrictions under the guise of 
police power.” 187  The court added, for good measure, “If the zoning 
restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity for the public welfare, as, in our 
opinion, do the restrictions controverted here, they must be stricken as an 
unconstitutional invasion of property rights.”188  The court came to this 
conclusion even though the record indicated “that the value of his property 
[zoned for residential use] actually increased from its purchase price of 
$23,500 to $32,500, between the date of purchase in June of 1957 to the 
date of the final hearing herein on June 3, 1963.”189 This increase in value 
signals that residential use of the parcel was legitimate. However, the 
supreme court could employ the improper t to support the conclusion that 
because industrial use, too, was a legitimate use of the property, the county 
had violated the landowner’s rights. 
Florida remained the setting in the 1990s for one of the most fruitful 
examples of the invocation of the improper t. Between 1987 and 1995, 
Devoe L. Moore attempted to develop a 28.6-acre parcel in Tallahassee that 
at the time of purchase “was zoned for service, commercial and industrial 
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187. Id. at 823, 823 n.2. 
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uses.”190 Negotiations with the city regarding the location of a sewer line 
dragged on, as did Moore’s attempt to secure a development permit, leading 
the landowner plaintiff to suspect “that Defendant [city] subjected them to 
this extended delay so that Defendant could eventually acquire the Land 
from Plaintiffs at as low a price as possible.”191 Adding insult to injury, 
Moore asserted that he lost a $5.25 million offer to purchase his property 
because of limitations that the city imposed on the purchaser's development 
plans.192 In March, 1995, Moore sold more than 25 acres to the state of 
Florida for $3.615 million and contracted with the state to sell the remaining 
acreage for $385,000.193  
Moore sued the city for damages under § 1983,194 owing to the alleged 
violation of his substantive due process rights and in inverse condemnation 
“as a result of Defendant’s acts which amounted to a temporary deprivation 
of [Moore’s] use of [his] property.”195 Federal district court Judge Maurice 
M. Paul denied the city’s motion for summary judgment for both claims.196 
After identifying the first count “an ‘as applied’ arbitrary and capricious 
due process claim,”197 Judge Paul explained that Moore was required to 
make two demonstrations: “First, the claim must be shown to involve a 
constitutionally protected or fundamental interest; second, the claim must 
be shown to represent an abuse of government power sufficient to raise an 
ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation.”198  
The improper t appeared in the discussion of how Moore, despite 
realizing a multi-million dollar return on his investment, had easily passed 
the deprivation of property threshold. The sentences preceding the improper 
t read: “The Court finds that a constitutionally protected interest is at stake 
in this litigation—namely, the right of Plaintiffs to develop and/or sell the 
Land. Individuals’ ability to own land and put it to lawful use is a 
fundamental American freedom.”199 Judge Paul put Moore’s substantive 
due process claim on the fast track, concluding “that the record contains 
	
190. Moore v. City of Tallahassee, 928 F. Supp. 1140, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 1995). 
191. Id. at 1143. 
192. See id. at 1144. 
193. See id. 
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
195. Moore, 928 F. Supp. at 1142. 
196. Judge Paul granted summary judgment to the city on a procedural due process claim based 
on the allegation that city officials were “biased decisionmakers acting under a clear conflict of interest.” 
Id. at 1144. 
197. Id. at 1145. 
198. Id. 











evidence which, if believed, would support Plaintiffs’ position that 
Defendant abused its legitimate powers.”200 
The Moore opinion had a mixed legacy. In 1998, another federal district 
judge, Ralph W. Nimmons, Jr., granted a city’s motion to dismiss a § 1983 
due process claim brought by a group of disgruntled developers who lost a 
sale to the Duval County School Board of a twenty-acre new school site.201 
The School Board had followed the recommendation of the city of 
Jacksonville’s Environmental Protection Board not to purchase the parcel 
because of its proximity to a Superfund site.202  
Judge Nimmons declined to follow Moore, noting that the decision from 
another district had no precedential value. In his attempt to explain why the 
Moore court misunderstood Roberge, however, Judge Nimmons himself 
quoted the improper t, thereby exacerbating rather than resolving the error: 
[Roberge] merely holds that the right to utilize real property for 
legitimate purposes is “property” within the protection of the 
Constitution and does not distinguish between the substantive and 
procedural components of due process. Additionally, Roberge 
predates modern Supreme Court due process jurisprudence. Further, 
both Roberge and Moore are zoning cases—cases in which the court 
is called upon to determine whether the local government decision to 
grant or withhold permission to utilize land in a particular way was 
exercised free from arbitrariness and caprice. Such cases rely upon a 
distinct, discrete body of case law in recognizing a substantive due 
process right in such a context. As with Roberge, it is not clear 
whether such cases survive modern Supreme Court and Circuit due 
process jurisprudence.203 
Yet the problem is not that Roberge is anachronistic; it is that the Moore 
court relied on a mistake. 
Unfortunately, Moore’s reign of error continued in the Sunshine State. 
In 2016 a state trial court, in Richman Group of Florida, Inc. v. Pinellas 
County,204 rendered a damages judgment exceeding $16 million because the 
Countywide Planning Authority failed to approve a Countywide Land Use 
Plan Amendment sought by a developer with plans to build an apartment 
	
200. Id. at 1146. The court also allowed the inverse condemnation claim to proceed, noting that 
Moore had “introduced evidence which, if believed, indicates that Defendant’s calculated, dilatory 
tactics prevented them from developing their land for roughly four years.” Id. at 1147. 
201. Collins & Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 1998). 
202. See id. at 1340. 
203. Id. at 1343 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
204. No. 14-005608CI-15, 2016 WL 8376580 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 29, 2016), rev’d, 253 So. 3d 662 











complex with some office space. The court relied on Moore to fast-track the 
due process claim: 
Florida has long recognized that a constitutionally protected property 
right “to own land and put it to lawful use” exists as a “fundamental 
American freedom.” Moore v. City of Tallahassee (citing State of 
Washington v. Roberge (“the right . . . to devote . . . land to any 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution.”) 
. . . . To that end, a land-use application that fully complies with 
existing regulations constitutes a property interest subject to federal 
due process protection.205 
Although the award was reversed a year later (the district court of appeal 
found that county officials did have a rational basis for the denial of the 
zoning change),206 the appellate court did note that “[t]he County raise[d] 
no challenge to the trial court’s finding that Richman [the developer] had a 
constitutionally recognizable interest in the proposed amendment.”207 The 
failure by court and counsel to recognize that the Moore court’s conclusion 
was based on a mistaken reading of Roberge led to the questionable 
conclusion that an owner can have a property interest not just in the 
continued use of real estate in a permitted fashion, but also in a government 
regulator’s determination regarding the future, not-yet-permitted use of that 
real estate.208 
c. Takings 
In 1956, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. 
City of Garfield Heights,209 delivered good news to a brickmaker that was 
forced to close business through the Great Depression and World War II. 
When the company opened a new brick plant in 1951, it learned that the city 
had amended its zoning ordinance and rezoned the company’s 81-acre 
parcel for residential use. In response to the company's claim that it was 
	
205. Id. at *10 (citations omitted). 
206. See Pinellas Cnty. v. Richman Grp. of Fla., 253 So. 3d 662, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
207. Id. at 669. 
208. A pattern similar to the Moore opinion’s reliance on the “property” version of Roberge has 
emerged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but technically these are not improper t 
cases. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have 
recognized a constitutionally ‘protected property interest’ in a landowner’s right to ‘devote [his] land to 
any legitimate use.’ Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Wash. ex 
rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210 (1928))).  Here, 
presumably, the alleged overzealous and selective regulation of Squaw Valley interferes with its use of 
its real property.”) (emphasis added). Abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 











continuing a nonconforming use, the city asserted that the company had 
abandoned the prior industrial use.  
The appellate court affirmed the ruling in favor of the plaintiff, and Judge 
Lee E. Skeel cited the (incorrect) headnotes from the Lawyer’s Edition 
version of Roberge directly after the following defense of the company’s 
property rights: 
It is not economically sound for the community to lock from use 
valuable minerals deposited by nature under the surface of the land 
to the almost total destruction of its value without any benefit to the 
people or damage to surrounding territory and where the health, 
morals, safety and the general welfare or common good of the people 
is in fact not thereby affected.210 
As noted previously, the headnotes for the electronic version of the decision 
on LexisNexis still contain the improper t.211 
Although Judge Skeel provided additional justification for his 
conclusion,212  the Cleveland Builders court's use of the improper t, as in all 
such cases, would provide fodder for dozens of additional mistakes in briefs, 
books, articles, and other legal documents for generations to come. 
2. Secondary Materials 
The improper t has made its presence felt far beyond case reporters. For 
example, the inclusion of the improper t in the West headnotes for Roberge 
has misled the compilers of at least two important legal encyclopedias. 
Section 674 of American Jurisprudence, devoted to “Real Property” under 
the general topic of “Constitutional Law,” instructed its wide readership that 
“[t]he right to devote real estate to any legitimate use is property within the 
protection of the Constitution . . . ” 213  Section 462 of New York 
Jurisprudence, the “land use” section comprising part of the discussion of 
“What Constitutes Property” for due process purposes, begins by 
(mis)informing its readers that “[t]he right to devote real estate to any 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the due process clause.”214 
This treatise, like so many other West Publishing secondary sources, relies 
on the key numbering and digest system. In this way, the seminal, 
uncorrected error in the key number found in the original Supreme Court 
	
210. Id. at 109. 
211. See supra note 17. 
212. See Cleveland Builders, 136 N.E.2d at 111 (“The location of the property, contiguous to and 
abutting along a railroad, and other property zoned for commercial use, and its topography, make any 
possible use of the property in the classification as zoned exceedingly doubtful . . . .”). 
213. 12 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § 674 (1938) (citing Roberge).  











Reports version of Roberge (and still on Westlaw)215 has spawned a legacy 
of misrepresentation. 216Authors of articles, books, and continuing legal 
education materials have also doubled down on the error in support of 
arguments regarding the availability of relief on procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and takings grounds.  
a. Procedural Due Process 
The most curious appearance of the improper t is in a 1995 law review 
article by Professor Gregory Stein—“Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in 
the Federal Courts.” 217  In this provocative article, Professor Stein has 
proposed a procedural due process litigation strategy (to redress “an interim 
due process violation”218 ) as a more feasible alternative to drawn-out, 
unnecessarily complex, regulatory takings claims brought by frustrated 
landowners in federal court. Luckily for Professor Stein, there are a few 
federal circuits that are more willing to allow these due process challenges 
to proceed: “These circuits have been unanimous in their unwillingness to 
bar procedural due process claims solely due to an inability to find a 
protected property interest. The only issue for these courts seems to be 
whether the landowner has been deprived of that presumed property 
interest.”219  One of the key cases cited by Professor Stein is the Ninth 
Circuit’s 1990 ruling in Harris v. County of Riverside.220 Unfortunately, in 
attempting to correct what he (or his editors) perceived to be an error in the 
Harris court’s quotation from Roberge, the article actually introduces the 
reader to the improper t.221 
	
215. The reader will recall that the LexisNexis headnotes also contain the error, despite the fact 
that the text reads “properly.” See supra note 17. 
216. Even the “Notes of Decisions” for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
found in West’s United States Code Annotated (USCA) include the improper t (as the first note in § 
7452 (“Property interest—Generally”), under heading LXXIX “Zoning”).  
217. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
218. Id. at 86. 
219.    Id. at 83 (footnote omitted). 
220. 904 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990). Professor Stein writes that the Harris court “agreed to hear a 
procedural due process claim even though plaintiff’s regulatory takings and substantive due process 
claims were not yet ripe. The court noted that any injuries arising from the questionable procedures had 
already occurred and thus did not depend on the outcome of the process.” Stein, supra note 217, at 76–
77 (footnote omitted). 
221. See Stein, supra note 217, at 83 n.284 (“Harris, 904 F.2d at 503 (quoting Washington ex rel. 
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928): ‘The right of [an owner] to devote [his] 
land to any legitimate use is properly [sic; “property” in original] within the protection of the 











b. Substantive Due Process 
The most famous author to use the improper t as a building block for 
judicial activism to protect fundamental property rights was Bernard Siegan. 
The longtime law professor at the University of San Diego and failed Ninth 
Circuit nominee,222 Siegan was well known for, among other libertarian 
causes, his advocacy of Land Use Without Zoning. 223  In 2003, Siegan 
published a chapter on “The Benefits of Non-Zoning” in a collection of 
essays by various urban experts. 224  Siegan insisted that “[t]he Roberge 
decision should be interpreted as a limitation upon the Euclid ruling,” and 
complained that “to the best of my knowledge, neither the judiciary nor the 
major constitutional law casebooks have acknowledged this.”225  
A key component of Siegan’s misunderstanding of Roberge lay in his 
reliance on the improper t: 
In contrast to the deferential level of scrutiny of Euclid, the Supreme 
Court stated that legislatures must not under the guise of the police 
power, “impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable 
upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities.” 
Delegation of the police power to a group of property owners violated 
the Constitution. The court asserted that the right of the plaintiff “to 
devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the protection 
of the constitution.”226 
Siegan was far from alone among authors who compounded the Roberge 
error. 
c. Takings 
Fans of the Supreme Court’s pro-owner decision in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council 227  invoked the improper t to bolster Justice 
Scalia’s finding that the state’s Beachfront Management Act may have 
affected a total taking of Lucas’s two beachfront parcels. 228  Professor 
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Robert Washburn explained in a 1993 article that “Lucas’s right to build on 
his property is entitled to constitutional protection,” quoting the improper t 
sentence for support.229 
A second post-Lucas piece quoting the improper t is a portend of future 
litigation. The author was James Burling, a leading property rights advocate 
for the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF),230 who, in a 1995 CLE contribution, 
included Roberge in a footnote as one of three 1920s due process challenges 
to zoning that did not discuss regulatory takings.231 
Burling and the PLF are important players in the private property rights 
movement, an alliance of academic lawyers and practitioners who have 
pursued an anti-regulatory agenda in the land use and environmental realm 
for several decades.232 The best examples of their handiwork,233 though, can 
be found in briefs and other court documents that also feature, sometimes 
prominently, the improper t. 
3. Briefs and Trial Documents 
As early as 1931, a Supreme Court brief featured the improper t in a 
discussion of the due process threshold requirements. The case, Texas & 
Pacific Railway v. United States,234 was ultimately a successful challenge to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission’s attempt to impose commodity rate 
differentials on shippers to gulf coast destinations. The brief for railroads 
challenging the ICC rate orders included Roberge as one of several cases in 
support of the proposition that the Court had “repeatedly held that the right 
to use and enjoy the use of property comes within the protection of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment as to the federal government and the 
	
229. Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REV. 162, 214 n.353 (1993). 
230. James S. Burling, PAC. LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.org/staff/james-
burling/?gclid=CjwKCAjw8J32BRBCEiwApQEKgRKIXx2GNQxjFdisbxhlrKz9xRaOMO4pqntbDN
x-jarDQzITNRaETBoCrl8QAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/62MQ-62JB]. 
231. See James S. Burling, Of Nuisances and Public Trusts—Can Lucas Be Evaded?,  C997 ALI-
ABA 259, 269 n.12 (May 4, 1995). 
232. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and 
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) (finding “a large and 
increasingly successful campaign by conservatives and libertarians to use the federal judiciary to achieve 
an anti-regulatory, anti-environmental agenda”). On the activities of PLF and Burling, see id. at 540–
42, and on the NAHB, see id. at 545. See also James Pollack, Note, The Takings Project Revisited: A 
Critical Analysis of this Expanding Threat to Environmental Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 235, 262–
63 (2020) (footnote omitted) (“Organizations like PLF thrive not only because they have a set of beliefs, 
but also because they get cases in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
233. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Kittery Retail Ventures, L.L.C. v. Town of 
Kittery, 544 U.S. 906 (2005) (No. 04-943), 2005 WL 79245 (Burling was one of two named Counsel of 
Record from the PLF). 











Fourteenth Amendment as to the state governments.”235 The challengers 
prevailed, but not on due process grounds.236 
Over the last several decades, in an interesting array of disputes in federal 
and state courts, counsel representing property owners and amici curiae 
have featured the improper t in several dozen briefs and trial documents 
designed to convince courts that private property owners were deserving of 
more robust protection from confiscatory and unreasonable land use 
regulations.237 Some Roberge misquotations appear somewhat innocuously 
in discussions of the delegation of regulatory power to neighbors and other 
citizens (the main focus of the 1928 decision).238 Yet by the close of the 
twentieth century, the error-based assertion that the owner’s right “to devote 
its land to any legitimate use is property,” and thus deserving of special 
constitutional protection, had become a recurrent theme in court filings 
seeking to supercharge substantive due process and other constitutional 
challenges. This is a fascinating, real-world experiment in the development 
of legal doctrine through advocacy, even though that advocacy is based on 
a foundational flaw.   
The number of briefs submitted by organizations and prominent 
attorneys identified with the private property rights movement is 
noteworthy. The PLF filed three amicus briefs, the National Association of 
Home Builders (NAHB) filed four amicus briefs, and James Burling and 
Gideon Kanner239 were each listed as counsel of record in two separate 
	
235. Brief on Behalf of the Texas & Pacific Railway Co., Appellant at 239, 241, Tex. & Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. U.S., 289 U.S. 627 (1933) (No. 1), 1931 WL 67628.  
236. See Tex. & Pac., 289 U.S. at 631 (“The Commission found that export and import rates on 
fourteen commodities from or to points in Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Southern Kansas, and Louisiana 
west of the Mississippi river were unduly prejudicial to Galveston and unduly preferential of New 
Orleans.”). 
 237. Westlaw and LexisNexis searches turned up forty-two appellate briefs (from thirty-five 
different cases, twenty-three of which were filed in the U.S. Supreme Court) and sixteen trial documents 
(from fifteen cases) that included the improper t. Because neither service can claim universal coverage, 
especially of trial court documents, readers should consider these as a representative set of documents. 
238. See, e.g., Answer to Petition for Review at 18, Vaquero Energy, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kern, 2020 
Cal. LEXIS 1513 (No. S259887) (company unsuccessfully asserted that oil and gas permitting ordinance 
that depended on surface owner’s consent was invalid delegation); Brief for Appellants at 49–50, Gant 
v. Okla. City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933) (No. 547), 1932 WL 33481 (failing to demonstrate that requiring 
sureties to post bond before acquiring oil and gas drilling license constituted unconstitutional 
delegation); see also Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 31–32, Campbell v. U.S., 45 F. App’x 50 (2d Cir. 
2002) (No. 01-6270), 2002 WL 32317658 (succeeding in defense against taxpayer challenge to allegedly 
unconstitutional deduction provisions in a brief by James B. Comey, then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York). 
239. Kanner is a legendary eminent domain attorney. In fact, he and fellow property rights 
advocate Toby Brigham grace the name of the “Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize,” awarded 
annually to an outstanding expert in the field by William and Mary Law School in honor of the pair’s 
“lifetime contributions to private property rights, their efforts to advance the constitutional protection of 
property, and their accomplishments in preserving the important role that private property plays in 











cases. To date, the track record for those asserting that the right to make use 
of property for any legitimate use is itself property has been mediocre. With 
the infusion of libertarians and other conservatives on the federal courts 
during the Trump Administration,240 the prospects of success might have 
been brighter, except for the fact that this Article has now exposed a very 
weak link in this advocacy chain. 
a. Procedural Due Process 
Many appellate briefs have featured the improper t in a combined 
discussion of procedural and substantive due process (discussed in 3b 
below), but only one focused solely on the procedural variety, a party brief 
in a case involving a society that was denied a special use permit because 
local officials did not consider the group to be a church.241 Counsel argued 
that the Michigan trial court had improperly ruled that the society’s 
procedural due process rights were not violated, because of “the bias of 
Township officials” 242  and because those officials applied 
unconstitutionally vague standards.243 The improper t appeared in a footnote 
to the first proposition, preceded by this sentence: “There can be no doubt 
that the Church has a constitutionally protected interest in the use of its 
property for religious worship.”244 The society’s counsel had made nearly 
the exact procedural due process argument in a motion in opposition to the 
township’s motion for partial summary judgment, including verbatim the 
quoted sentence preceding the misquotation from Roberge.245 The Court of 
Appeals of Michigan was not convinced, rejecting all of the society’s 
constitutional claims.246 
	
Prize, YALE L. SCH. (Sept. 5, 2008), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/bob-ellickson-66-awarded-
brigham-kanner-property-rights-prize [https://perma.cc/J62K-MED6]. 
240. See, e.g., Judicial Confirmations Update, SENATE RPC (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/judicial-confirmations-update [https://perma.cc/8Y7S-
NF35] (“The Senate has worked diligently to cement President Trump’s legacy on the federal courts. 
With this week’s confirmation of Cory Wilson to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Senate has 
confirmed 200 Trump-appointed judges to Article III judgeships.”).  
241. See Plaintiff/appellant Great Lakes Society’s Brief in Opposition to Application for Leave to 
Appeal, Great Lakes Soc’y v. Georgetown Charter Twp., 761 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 
270031), 2007 WL 6454942. 
242. See id. at 48. 
243. See id. at 49. 
244. Id. at 48 n.29.  
245. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Disposition of All 
Counts Asserting a Violation of the United States or Michigan Constitution at 20 n.18, Great Lakes 
Soc’y v. Georgetown Charter Twp., 761 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 03-45966-AA), 2007 
WL 6695088. 












A little digging turned up a trial brief filed in another religious rights-
related case, this one filed in a California federal court a few months before 
the motion in the Michigan case.247 Alameda County officials had denied a 
conditional use permit that would have allowed Redwood Christian Schools 
“to build a 650-student combined junior-senior high school.”248 The bias 
argument, the Roberge misquotation, and the preceding sentence are nearly 
identical.249 While local counsel differed, what the two plaintiffs’ teams had 
in common was participation by attorneys from The Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, a well-respected advocate for religious rights. 
Apparently, zealous warriors for all kinds of rights are equally susceptible 
to making mistakes. 
Perhaps the most intriguing of the trial briefs is a plaintiffs’ filing in 
Hardesty v. Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District,250 
a case that initially resulted in a $100+ million judgment for due process 
violations that in the summer of 2020 was remanded by the U.S Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a reduction in damages.251 One set of 
plaintiffs—the Schneider family, whose members mined on their ranch 
from the nineteenth century until prohibited to do so by county officials in 
2009252—alleged that  
the defendants violated their 14th Amendment due process rights by: 
revoking their land use entitlements, prohibiting their liquidation of 
stockpiled inventory, and levying fines and mandates on Plaintiffs 
without providing notice of the basis for the decisions, without any 
articulated standard of conduct the Plaintiffs were accused of 
violating, without an opportunity for Plaintiffs to rebut the charges 
against them in a meaningful way and at a meaningful time and 
without credible explanation of the basis for the decisions.253 
The first source cited to demonstrate that the Schneiders had met the 
threshold requirement was Moore v. City of Tallahassee,254 including the 
Roberge misquotation. 
	
247. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, Redwood Christian Schs. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2007 WL 781794 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (No. C-01-4282 SC ADR), 2007 WL 617426 [hereinafter Redwood Trial Brief]. 
248. Redwood Christian Schs. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2007 WL 781794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 
2007). 
249. See Redwood Trial Brief, supra note 247, at 23 n.41. 
250. Schneider Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 7, Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. 
Dist., 2020 WL 4816361 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2020) (No. 2:10-cv-02414-KJM-KJN) [hereinafter 
Schneider Brief]. 
251. See Hardesty v. Sacramento Cnty., 824 F. App’x 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2020). 
252. See Schneider Brief, supra note 250, at 1. 
253. Id. at 7. 
254. See id. (quoting Moore v. Tallahassee, 928 F. Supp. 140, 1145–46 (N.D. Fla. 1995)); see 











The plot thickens on the next page, in the discussion of the substantive 
due process count: “The Due Process Clause prohibits government officials 
from arbitrarily depriving a person of her constitutionally protected property 
or liberty interests. This includes the right to devote land to any legitimate 
use, and to pursue a given profession.”255 The 1990 case cited in support of 
the “legitimate use” right is the Ninth Circuit decision in Harris v. County 
of Riverside,256 a highly cited decision that correctly quoted the (“properly”) 
language from Roberge, but, in a problematic move, introduced that 
quotation by stating, “[w]e must also determine whether the County’s 
decision deprived Harris of a protected property interest prior to applying 
procedural due process. We find that it did.”257 In Harris, the court reversed 
a summary judgment in favor of the defendant county on a landowner’s 
claim that he was denied procedural due process (lack of notice) when the 
county downzoned for residential use property that he was already using for 
commercial purposes.258  
Hardesty, like Harris, involved landowners who were conducting a legal 
use (which could be deemed a vested right), whom the government 
subsequently subjected to more rigorous regulation. In other words, these 
plaintiffs were seeking to continue a legitimate use; they themselves, unlike 
the plaintiffs in the two church cases, were not seeking government 
permission to make more intensive use of their properties. 
Meanwhile, one year after Harris, the Supreme Court would be faced 
with a substantive due process challenge, based squarely on the 
misquotation from Roberge, that involved a landowner prevented from 
making a new and more lucrative use of its property. Even though the 
landowner failed, its attempt (and its reliance on the improper t) would 
continue to inspire due process challenges for decades to follow. 
b. Substantive Due Process 
In the 1930s and 1940s, attorneys seeking relief in the Supreme Court 
deployed the improper t to attack allegedly arbitrary or confiscatory land 
regulations governing outdoor advertising, 259  warehouse storage,260  rent 
	
255. Schneider Brief, supra note 250, at 8 (citations omitted). 
256. 904 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 133–134. 
257. Harris, 904 F.2d at 503 (emphasis added). 
258. See id. at 498, 504. 
259. See Brief of Appellants upon Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction at 19, 
Gen. Outdoor Advert. Co. v. Hoar, 297 U.S. 725 (1936) (Nos. 102, 103, 104), 1935 WL 32619. 
260. See Appellants’ Brief at 132, Indep. Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947) (No. 83), 











control,261 and the operation of trailer parks.262 The Justices frustrated all of 
these attempts, either rejecting the due process claims263 or choosing not to 
hear the case. 264  For four decades, the improper t did not make an 
appearance in Supreme Court briefs involving the due process threshold. 
That period of desuetude ended with a vengeance in 1991, when a case that 
temporarily drew the attention of the Court, PFZ Properties, Inc. v. 
Rodriguez,265 set the tone for a sustained effort by counsel championing 
private property rights to weaponize the improper t, an effort that lasts to 
this day. 
 i. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez 
Roberge first appeared near the latter stages of litigation pitting a 
developer with ambitious plans for a hotel and residential development 
against Puerto Rican officials whose actions and attitudes shifted from 
cooperative, to dilatory, to antagonistic. According to the federal district 
court that, in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, “accept[ed] the 
allegations in the amended complaint as true,”266 PFZ had owned 1,358.65 
cuerdas (each .97 of an acre) of property in Vacia Talega, Puerto Rico.267 In 
1976 the Puerto Rico Planning Board granted PFZ permission to create 
several thousand residential and hotel units in two phases (a decision that 
withstood a state court challenge brought by local residents),268 and five 
years later officials of the Puerto Rico Regulations and Permits 
Administration (ARPE) approved preliminary plans for the first section of 
the development.269  
After a few years of administrative give-and-take, things turned sour in 
1986, when two senators, concerned about the ecological impact of the 
	
261. See Brief for Appellees at 6, Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (No. 486), 
1947 WL 44360. 
262. See Motion of Appellant to Set Aside Per Curiam Order Entered May 29, 1950, Sustaining 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Want of a Substantial Federal Question and Brief in Support at 7–8, 
Glissmann v. Omaha, 339 U.S. 960 (1950) (No. 792), 1950 WL 78443.  
263. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1948) (upholding federal rent 
control statute); Indep. Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 71–72, 80–82, 89 (1947) (affirming state 
supreme court decision upholding warehouse storage ordinance). 
264. Glissmann v. City of Omaha, 339 U.S. 960, 960 (1950) (per curiam) (dismissing challenge, 
for want of substantial federal question, brought by lessee who wished to open trailer park), dismissing 
appeal from 39 N.W.2d 895, 831 (Neb. 1949); Gen. Outdoor Advert. Co. v. Callahan, 297 U.S. 725, 725 
(1936) (dismissing challenge to outdoor advertising restrictions), dismissing appeal from 193 N.E. 799, 
803 (Mass. 1935). 
265. 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 503 U.S. 257 (1992). 
266. P.F.Z. Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 739 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.P.R. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 28 (1st 
Cir. 1991). 
267. Id. at 69 & n.3. 
268. Id. at 69 n.5. 











development, proposed a bill designed “to conserve for scientific, 
ecological and passive recreation purposes the Vacia Talega area, an area 
known for its mangrove-rich lands.”270 Adding insult to injury, ARPE’s 
enthusiasm for the development cooled off considerably, and in the closing 
months of 1987 newspapers “reported that the Governor was reevaluating 
public policy on the environmentally sensitive coastal area of Vacia Talega 
and that no permit decision would be made until a new public policy could 
be determined.” 271  Faced with ARPE resistance and gubernatorial 
opposition, PFZ filed suit on December 28, 1987,272 and in its amended 
complaint asserted that by “deliberately delay[ing] processing of the 
construction drawings and illegally refus[ing] to process construction 
drawings pursuant to Puerto Rico law, ARPE's regulations and practices,” 
agency officials’ “deliberate actions have deprived PFZ of its constitutional 
rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection.”273 
On the procedural due process threshold issue, U.S. District Judge 
Hector M. Laffitte assumed without deciding “that PFZ acquired a property 
interest in obtaining a construction permit for its project.”274 PFZ lost this 
claim, however, as the court ruled that the developer had “received minimal 
due process in the form of reconsideration before the agency and appeal 
before the local courts.”275 
The court also gave the cold shoulder to PFZ’s substantive due process 
claim, despite allegations that ARPE “arbitrarily, capriciously or illegally 
delayed and denied review of the construction drawings,” and that “the 
handling of its project was tainted with fundamental procedural 
irregularities.”276  Judge Laffitte pointed out that “[t]he First Circuit has 
repeatedly found that controversies surrounding rejections of proposed land 
development projects and denials of permits [do] not amount to a federal 
constitutional violation” and “that even where state officials have clearly 
violated state law in the area of land planning or zoning, this action does not 
rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.”277 
	
270. Id. at 70. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. After the ARPE decided that the 1976 and 1981 approvals were no longer effective and 
denied PFZ’s request to reconsider, based on the allegation that the agency officials relied on the wrong 
set of drawings, the developer was unsuccessful in superior court, which affirmed the agency’s decision. 
Id.   
273. Id. In its original complaint, PFZ alleged that “Defendant’s refusal to approve and issue 
building permits constitutes an illegal taking of plaintiff’s property without just compensation.” Joint 
Appendix at 92, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122). 
274. P.F.Z. Props., 739 F. Supp. at 71.  
275. Id. at 72. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. The court also ruled that “PFZ has failed to state a cause of action for violation of equal 











Not surprisingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an 
opinion written by Judge Levin H. Campbell, affirmed the trial court’s triple 
dismissal.278 Once again, on the threshold question concerning the alleged 
procedural due process claim, the court assumed that PFZ’s questionable 
characterization was satisfactory: “Although we think it far from clear that 
PFZ’s expectation of receiving a construction permit from ARPE 
constituted a property interest under Puerto Rico law, we may assume, 
arguendo, that the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to establish 
such an interest.” 279  PFZ’s substantive due process claim was equally 
unpersuasive, as ARPE’s alleged actions did not shock the conscience.280 
Without any facts indicating “discrimination based on an invidious 
classification such as race or sex,” or “egregious procedural irregularities,” 
PFZ’s equal protection claim also fell short on appeal.281 
So far Roberge had not been a factor in either federal court, and that was 
true also of PFZ’s petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the Supreme 
Court.282 PFZ sought review on two questions, one pertaining to procedural 
due process283 and the other, the one that the Justices agreed to hear,284 
reading: “Whether an arbitrary, capricious or illegal denial of a construction 
permit to a developer by officials acting under color of state law can state a 
substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”285 PFZ’s counsel 
explained that the Court needed to bring the First Circuit in line with other 
courts of appeal: 
In light of the First Circuit’s repeated adherence to its standard that 
substantive due process rights are not ordinarily implicated in 
situations involving the denial of a development project or a building 
permit notwithstanding facially sufficient allegations of arbitrary, 
capricious and illegal conduct, and the acknowledged widespread 
disagreement with this standard expressed in the other federal 
circuits, the Supreme Court should grant the petition to resolve a 
well-recognized conflict on this constitutional issue.286 
	
278. See PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 503 U.S. 257 (1992).  
279. Id. at 30–31. 
280. See id. at 31–32. 
281. Id. at 32. 
282. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, PFZ 
Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122) [hereinafter PFZ Cert. Pet.] (no mention of 
Roberge in entire document). 
283. See id. at i. 
284. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 502 U.S. 956, 956 (1991) (“Petition for writ of certiorari 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted limited to Question 2 presented by the 
petition.”)  
285. PFZ Cert. Pet., supra note 282, at i. 











To the respondents’ counter that “[t]he facts of this case . . . afford no 
occasion to consider an alleged split of authority in the circuits,”287 PFZ 
asserted that in the view of the First Circuit, an arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal denial of a building permit “cannot implicate substantive due 
process, unless the improper motivation is accompanied by the deprivation 
of another specific constitutional right.”288 
On December 27, 1991, six weeks after the Court agreed to consider the 
substantive due process question, the improper t appeared in the petitioner’s 
brief289 and in an amicus brief filed by the NAHB.290 In neither instance was 
this a minor addition.  
PFZ asserted that by dismissing the substantive due process allegation 
the court of appeals had “ignored this Court’s recognition that the legitimate 
use of private property is a protected constitutional right.”291 The source for 
this purported right appeared in the argument under a separate heading: 
“Other Protected Rights—The Right to Devote Private Property to a 
Legitimate Use.” 292  PFZ’s counsel had first established that “the Due 
Process Clause includes a substantive component which bars certain 
‘arbitrary, wrongful’ government actions, ‘regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them,’”293 then had noted that “[t]he Court 
affords fundamental rights extraordinary judicial protection.”294 But, PFZ 
claimed, other non-fundamental rights were protected as well: 
The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of other 
rights implicating “life, liberty, or property,” as well. Thus, within 
the context of substantive due process, this Court has expressly 
recognized that the right of a landowner “to devote its land to any 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the 
Constitution.”295 
Counsel for PFZ then doubled down on the improper t, asserting, “[t]his 
recognition that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
protects the right of a landowner to devote his land to legitimate use is 
	
287. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 25, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) 
(No. 91-122). 
288. PFZ Cert. Pet., supra note 282, at 12. 
289. Brief of Petitioner at 14, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122) 
[hereinafter PFZ Pet. Brief]. 
290. Motion of the NAHB for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief & Brief in Support of the 
Petitioner at 2, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122) [hereinafter PFZ NAHB 
Amicus Brief]. 
291. PFZ Pet. Brief, supra note 289, at 10 (emphasis added). 
292. Id. at 14. 
293. Id. at 11 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). 
294. Id. at 14. 











reflected in numerous decisions of the Court,”296 even though none of the 
cases cited referred to this purported right,297 a right whose characterization 
as property is based on an error.298 
By weaving into its argument the foundation-less notion that the right to 
devote land to a legitimate use is itself property, PFZ was vulnerable to 
attack—first by the respondents and then, more importantly, by the Justices. 
Respondents argued that the “denial of a construction permit to petitioner 
has not deprived it of a constitutional property or ‘liberty’ interest” and has 
“not placed any unconstitutional restrictions on petitioner’s asserted right 
‘to devote its land to any legitimate use.’”299 In fact, every time respondents’ 
counsel referred to this right they expressed skepticism by using the 
adjective “asserted.”300  
Respondents’ counsel carefully examined the inappropriateness of, and 
difficulties concerning, PFZ’s “asserted right,” explaining that PFZ “cites 
to the Court’s cases on zoning restrictions on the use of land, and proposes 
a test to review alleged official misconduct that is incongruous in the context 
of a Sec. 1983 claim to redress deprivations of federally protected rights.”301 
PFZ had fallen far short of the demonstration required by Supreme Court 
precedent: 
Its asserted right “to devote its land to any legitimate use” has not 
been articulated with reliance to traditional concepts of property or 
liberty. Petitioner suggests that an independent constitutional interest 
lurking somewhere should be recognized in its own right. In light of 
its reliance on the Due Process Clause itself, PFZ is asserting only a 
generalized right to be free from arbitrary and capricious 
governmental conduct.302 
The purported right was indeed “lurking somewhere,” and that somewhere 
was in the original, uncorrected version of Roberge. 
	
296. Id. at 15. 
297. The phrase “legitimate use” does not even appear in the opinions of the four cases cited at 
id.: Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Vill. of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
298. Of the amici in support of PFZ, only the NAHB incorporated the improper t into its brief, in 
the first paragraph of the initial section of its argument (“THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS REFUSED TO 
RECOGNIZE THAT A LANDOWNER HAS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN THE USE OF ITS LAND”). 
PFZ NAHB Amicus Brief, supra note 290, at 4. 
299. Respondents’ Brief at 16, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122) 
[hereinafter PFZ Resp. Brief] (emphasis added).  
300. See id. at 16–17, 25, 27–29, 37. 
301. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 











In oral argument on February 26, 1992, the Justices seemed puzzled by 
PFZ attorney Thomas Richichi’s invocation of his client’s right to devote 
land to a legitimate use: 
QUESTION [Justice White]: . . . is the only issue before us is if there 
is a property right, was it taken?  
MR. RICHICHI: I think the only issue is the latter, if there was a 
property right, was it taken. This Court has said in the State of 
Washington v. Roberge that the right to devote one’s land to a 
legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution. 
The Court has more recently said in the Nollan case that the right to 
build on one’s property is not even remotely something along the 
lines of a government benefit, that there is a right to build on one’s 
property.  And that one arose in the constitutional context. 
QUESTION [Chief Justice Rehnquist]: Well, stated that flatly, that 
there is a right to build on one’s property, I mean you have to add any 
number of qualifications to that. There is not a right to build an 8-
story office building on property that’s zoned for a single-family 
residence. 
MR. RICHICHI: That is exactly correct, Mr. Chief Justice. The 
protected right here at issue derives from the ownership of the land 
since the right to use the land is one of the most basic sticks in the 
bundle of land ownership. The—Puerto Rico, in the statutes that we 
have cited, recognizes the right to build on one’s property and 
recognizes the right to make use of one’s property.303 
PFZ’s counsel had actually read out loud the misquotation from a Court 
precedent, and not one of the Justices corrected this error.  
The Takings Clause’s last appearance in the litigation had been a claim 
in the original complaint that PFZ dropped in its amended version. But one 
couldn’t tell from Richichi’s argument: 
QUESTION [Justice O’Connor]: It sounds like you’re trying to make 
a takings claim dressed up as a due process claim. I’m still confused 
about what it is you’re claiming. It’s just, it is totally unclear to me 
	
303. PFZ Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 2, at 12–13 (emphasis added); Oral Argument at 
12:10, PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992) (No. 91-122),  












what it is you’re really claiming here and what property you say has 
been taken, and what is the nature of the claim. 
MR. RICHICHI: Justice O’Connor, we do not allege that any 
property has been taken. We have alleged that a property right 
protected by the due process clause has been deprived. Again I would 
draw the distinction between the taking and the deprivation, I think— 
QUESTION [Justice O’Connor]: Is absolute the right to develop the 
property as proposed by your clients? 
MR. RICHICHI:  No, it is not an absolute right. It is a right to pursue 
a legitimate use which is subject to reasonable restrictions under the 
police power.304 
Justice O’Connor had identified the major flaw in PFZ’s Roberge-based 
argument. If the right to devote one’s land to a legitimate use were indeed 
itself property, then that would either (1) satisfy the threshold for a 
procedural due process claim or (2) be the basis for a takings claim.305 Both 
lower courts assumed that there was a property interest but still rejected the 
procedural due process claim. PFZ dropped its takings claim from the 
original complaint. All that was left was a substantive due process claim 
based on the procedural irregularities.306 
The bad news came quickly for PFZ. Only a dozen days later, the Justices 
announced, “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently 
granted.”307 While the Court did not explain its about-face, an important 
	
304. PFZ Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 2, at 19; PFZ Oral Argument Recording, supra 
note 303, at 20:02. 
305. PFZ’s counsel argued, “The protected right here at issue derives from the ownership of the 
land since the right to use the land is one of the most basic sticks in the bundle of land ownership.” PFZ 
Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 2, at 13; cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 
(1979) (footnote omitted) (holding “that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental 
element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take 
without compensation.”). 
306. See, e.g., PFZ Oral Argument Recording, supra note 303, at 23:48 (Justice Kennedy asked, 
“But what’s your best case from this Court, if there is one, indicating that that kind of manipulation 
constitutes not a procedural due process violation but a substantive due process violation?”). Even 
respondents’ counsel, Vanessa Ramirez, hedged her bets regarding whether the “asserted right” may be 
property: “The Court has already said it, and I would be in an awful position if I would have to argue to 
Your Honors that the Court has never recognized a property interest in a landowner’s desire or wish to 
devote his land to any legitimate use.” Id. at 46:14. None of the Justices corrected her. 
307. PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257, 257 (1992) (per curiam). The same day as the 
PFZ oral argument, the Court turned down another § 1983 substantive due process challenge. Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), concerned a sanitation worker whose widow claimed that 
she lost her husband “because the city customarily failed to train or warn its employees about known 
hazards in the workplace.” Id. at 117. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, observed that “the 
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Id. at 125 (citing to 











clue appears in a Preliminary Memorandum, dated April 24, 1992, that was 
prepared for the Justices by Ronald J. Tenpas, one of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s clerks, in response to PFZ’s petition for rehearing.308 Tenpas 
understood that  
the decision to DIG [dismiss the writ as improvidently granted] this 
case rested on the jelly-like nature of the particular facts in this case 
(every time you tried to grab them they slipped through your finger, 
leaving only a sticky residue behind), not any sentiment that the issue 
was unimportant.309 
In 2005, the Court took a big step toward differentiating between takings 
and substantive due process violations involving property. In a unanimous 
opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,310 Justice O’Connor, who had 
subjected PFZ’s counsel to searing inquiry, put to rest the notion that a 
property owner could show a violation of the Takings Clause by 
demonstrating that a challenged regulation did not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests.311 The Lingle Court clarified that “[t]here is no 
question that the ‘substantially advances’ formula was derived from due 
process, not takings, precedents,” and that “this formula prescribes an 
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no 
proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”312 Nevertheless, the quest for the 
holy grail of property rights advocates—the reinvigoration of substantive 
due process to rescue disgruntled landowners from arbitrary regulators—
continued, based in large part on the improper t. 
	
Rico over Vacia Talega has still not been resolved. The commonwealth’s plan to take the property by 
eminent domain has led to the latest wrangling over the amount of just compensation to which the 
frustrated developer is entitled. See, e.g., Eliván Martínez Mercado, Conectados Costa Serena y el 
Impuesto de Santini, CENTRO DE PERIODISMO INVESTIGATIVO (CPI) (Nov. 3, 2012, 2:34 PM), 
https://periodismoinvestigativo.com/2012/11/conectados-costa-serena-y-el-impuesto-de-santini/ 
[https://perma.cc/HM79-TB9S] (reporting that Puerto Rico was still litigating to remove PFZ Properties’ 
right to develop the area, the appraised value of which had increased from $4.9 million to $32 million, 
owing to development rights granted through the government's conservation program); Controversia 
por Proyecto de Construcción en Piñones, TELEMUNDO P.R. (June 4, 2015, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.telemundopr.com/noticias/local/controversia-por-proyecto-de-construccion-en-
pinones/17735/ [https://perma.cc/34U6-KF4M] (mentioning that the 2012 litigation over the $32 million 
appraised property valuation continues); see also Consulta de Casos, PODER JUD. DE P.R., 
https://www.ramajudicial.pr/index.php/consulta-de-casos/ [https://perma.cc/7SGT-DC9C] (showing 
the most recent entry in the court docket in the PFZ case as a pre-trial conference on Nov. 18,  2020).  
308. Ronald J. Tenpas, Preliminary Memorandum on Petition for Rehearing, PFZ Props. v. 
Rodriguez (Apr. 24, 1992) (on file with author); see also Ronald J. Tenpas, VINSON & ELKINS, 
https://www.velaw.com/people/ronald-j-tenpas/ [https://perma.cc/BJS8-VWTG]. 
309. Tenpas, Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 308, at 1–2. 
310. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
311. Id. at 548. 












In no fewer than eleven appellate briefs filed between 1992 and 2016, 
counsel for property owners, undaunted by (or perhaps inspired by) PFZ’s 
failure, relied on the improper t to bolster substantive due process claims. 
In not one of those cases did the property owner or owners prevail, as the 
courts either affirmed a ruling in favor of the regulator or denied certiorari. 
The cases were, for the most part, run-of-the-mill zoning and land use cases 
in which owners challenged a downzoning that prohibited mining;313  a 
rezoning coupled with a moratorium on development; 314  the denial of 
permit to demolish a duplex and replace it with a two-unit condominium;315 
the imposition of grading restrictions on beachfront owners; 316  a 
downzoning of a property upon which a purchaser planned to build an 
apartment complex;317 a delay in securing permits for hotel and marina 
construction; 318  a zoning amendment applied retroactively to deny a 
development application;319 the denial of a rezoning for commercial use;320 
the denial of an application to build a pedestrian path to the waterfront part 
of a parcel; 321  and the denial of hardship relief from landmark 
designation.322 
	
313. See Brief of Appellant at 37, Nello L. Teer Co. v. Orange Cnty., 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (No. 92-2240), 1992 WL 12124760. 
314. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Stubblefield Constr. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 
516 U.S. 913 (1995) (No. 95-114), 1995 WL 17035931; Brief of the NAHB et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Petitioners at 12, Stubblefield Constr. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 516 U.S. 913 (1995) 
(No. 95-114), 1995 WL 17048357. 
315. See Brief of the NAHB & the Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation as Amici Curiae 
in Support of the Petitioners at 4, Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 520 U.S. 1167 (1997) (No. 96-1278), 
1997 WL 33561334. 
316. See Brief of the NAHB et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 10, Buckley v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 528 U.S. 816 (1999) (No. 98-1894), 1999 WL 33640424. 
317. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Bryan v. City of Madison, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001) 
(No. 00-802), 2000 WL 34000545. 
318. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae & Brief Amicus Curiae of PLF in Support 
of Petitioner at 6, Yardarm Rest., Inc. v. City of Pompano Beach, 540 U.S. 1141 (2004) (No. 03-531), 
2003 WL 22720974. 
319. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Kittery Retail Ventures, L.L.C. v. Town of 
Kittery, 544 U.S. 906 (2005) (No. 04-943), 2005 WL 79245. 
320. See Brief of Appellants at 12 Hector v. City of Fargo, 760 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 2009) (No. 
20080177), 2008 WL 5452012. 
321. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 24–25, Richter v. City of Des Moines, 532 F. App’x 755 
(9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-35370), 2012 WL 3911764. 
322. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Stahl York Ave. Co. v. City of New York, 137 
S. Ct. 372 (2016) (No. 15-1467), 2016 WL 3162256 (misquoting Wash. ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. 
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928)) (“This Court should confirm that ownership of real property is one 
of the ‘property’ interests protected by due process. . . . In particular, this Court has acknowledged that 
the right of a landowner ‘to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the protection of’ due 
process.”). There were two atypical challenges as well, one brought by a neighbor who objected to the 
grant of a rezoning permitting a subdivision, the other brought against a city for refusing to rescind a tax 











The PLF and the NAHB continued their efforts to advance the law of 
substantive due process, crafting arguments in amici briefs based in part on 
what they mistakenly believed was the Court’s recognition in Roberge of a 
right as property itself. For example, one amici brief that NAHB, along with 
other builder and real estate organizations, filed in the Supreme Court 
attacked the “entitlement rule,” calling it “contrary to the decisions of this 
Court which have held that the property right protected by the Constitution 
is the right to use land subject, of course, to reasonable regulation.”323 The 
misquotation from Roberge appeared in a string of excerpts from Supreme 
Court cases under the heading, “The Courts of Appeals and the State Courts 
That Have Employed the Entitlement Analysis Have Disregarded Almost a 
Century of This Court’s Analysis of What Constitutes Property.”324 The 
Justices declined to hear Stubblefield Construction Company v. City of San 
Bernardino, however,325 leaving in place a decision of the Court of Appeal 
of California that reversed a jury award exceeding $11.5 million.  
The landowners had contended “that the city violated their substantive 
due process and equal protection rights by allegedly deliberately inflicting 
harm ‘when [City officials] irrationally and arbitrarily manipulated City 
processes and procedures, for no legitimate reason, so as to prevent 
Stubblefield from building a development Project it was unquestionably 
entitled to build.’”326 Even though the city had changed the zoning for the 
site and had imposed a development moratorium, the appellate court 
concluded, “[t]his is an ordinary dispute between a developer and a 
municipality and we conclude that the claims asserted simply do not qualify 
as deprivations of substantive due process.” 327  This quoted sentence 
summarizes the problem faced by NAHB, PLF, and their allies in the 
property rights movement: judges generally defer to local and state 
governments when landowners seek to overturn land use regulatory 
decisions. Persuading the Court to eliminate the “entitlement rule” in the 
real property context would be a small but significant step in the “rights” 
	
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Konrad v. Epley, 136 S. Ct. 148 (2015) (No. 14-1515), 2015 WL 
3878400; see also Brief of Appellants at 31, Jespersen v. Clark Cnty., 399 P.3d 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2017) (No. 48653-9-II), 2016 WL 7744966. 
323. Brief of the NAHB et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 8, Stubblefield 
Constr. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 516 U.S. 913 (1995) (No. 95-114), 1995 WL 17048357. 
324. Id. at 10–12. 
325. Stubblefield Constr. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 516 U.S. 913, denying cert. to 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
326. Stubblefield Constr. Co. v. City of San Bernardino, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413, 415 (Cal. Ct. App.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).  











direction, which is why, despite these roadblocks, the organizations 
continued to try to get the Justices’ attention.328  
In 2013, the PLF and the National Federation of Independent Business 
Small Business Legal Center filed an amici brief in the Hillcrest litigation 
discussed previously.329 In the argument’s first paragraph, designed to show 
how “the Constitution protects Hillcrest’s property rights,” counsel asserted 
that “[t]he Supreme Court recognizes that the Constitution protects the right 
of an owner to develop her property free from arbitrary or irrational 
requirements,” followed by the improper t.330 Counsel then attempted to 
demonstrate how the requirements imposed by the county’s Right of Way 
Preservation Ordinance violated the rules for exaction takings set out in 
Nollan and Dolan,331 and that this somehow, as the trial judge had found, 
constituted a substantive due process violation.  
While the county and the developer had already settled a multi million-
dollar takings claim, the substantive due process claim had survived.332 One 
brief, filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by 
Hillcrest’s counsel (in support of the district court’s finding), prefaced its 
own Roberge misquotation with the following assertion: 
[T]his case involves governmental interference with essential vested 
rights in land (i.e., the rights of ownership, legitimate economically 
beneficial use, possession, exclusion of others and alienation). These 
rights are not created only by state law. Rather, they are preexisting, 
natural private property rights that predated and are the express object 
of the protection of not only the United States Constitution, but also 
all state constitutions.333 
In an attempt to bolster this claim, counsel included a footnote to an over-
the-top 2008 Florida intermediate appellate court opinion that opined: 
	
328. For other examples of using the improper t  in an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the 
“entitlement rule,” see Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae & Brief Amicus Curiae of PLF in 
Support of Petitioner at 6, Yardarm Rest., Inc. v. City of Pompano Beach, 540 U.S. 1141 (2004) (No. 
03-531), 2003 WL 22720974; Brief of the NAHB & the Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation 
as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4–5, Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 520 U.S. 1167 
(1997) (No. 96-1278), 1997 WL 33561334. 
329. Brief Amicus Curiae of PLF & National Federation of Independent Business Small Business 
Legal Center in Support of Plaintiff/Appellee, Hillcrest Property, L.L.P., and in Support of Affirmance, 
Hillcrest Prop., L.L.C. v. Pasco Cnty., 754 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-12383), 2013 WL 
5404726 [hereinafter Hillcrest Amicus Brief]; see supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
330. Id. at 5. 
331. See id. at 8–17. 
332. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
333. Answer Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 33, Hillcrest Prop., L.L.C. v. Pasco Cnty., 754 F.3d 











“Private property rights have long been viewed as sacrosanct and 
fundamentally immune from government interference.”334 
The same record of futility was experienced by many trial counsel who 
attempted to win substantive due process claims based in part on the 
improper t. The trials in which landowners’ counsel filed memoranda, 
motions, and other documents involved conditions placed on plat approval 
for a subdivision;335 denial of an application for a revised master plan for a 
subdivision; 336  promulgation of a county Community Plan; 337  and 
implementation of a short-term rental ban.338 
In at least one case, the court lost its patience with overzealous counsel. 
Landowners in Eisenberg Development Corp. v. City of Miami Beach339 
contended that the city’s order to “install fire sprinklers before operating as 
a hotel” constituted violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses, and First Amendment retaliation.340 In their response to the city’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiffs had asserted, invoking 
the improper t, that the dispute “involves governmental interference with 
the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights in real property. These are pre-existing, 
natural property rights, such as the rights of ownership, legitimate 
economically beneficial use, possession, and exclusion of others (including 
the government) . . . .”341 The federal district court was so unimpressed that 
it granted attorneys’ fees and costs to the city, because “[a]ll of Plaintiffs’ 
federal claims . . . were patently frivolous and brought in bad faith.”342 
	
334. Id. at 33 n.24 (quoting CNL Resort Hotel, L.P., v. City of Doral, 991 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). The case involved the property now known as the Trump National Doral. 
Hannah Sampson, Donald Trump to Buy Doral Resort for $170 Million, PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 13, 
2011, 1:23 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20111013/NEWS/812022776 
[https://perma.cc/7NYZ-TQ3U]. 
335. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Resistance to the City of West Des Moines’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 32–33, Blumenthal Inv. Trs. v. City of W. Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 
2001) (No. CE 32820), 1997 WL 33828493. 
336. See Plaintiff’s Amended Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 26, 
Bloomingdale Dev., L.L.C. v. Hernando Cnty., 2009 WL 347786 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 8:07-cv-00575-
JSM-MAP), 2008 WL 7192248. 
337. See Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Hillsborough County’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 8, Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cnty., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d, 625 F. App’x. 
515 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 8:12–cv–2851–T–36TGW), 2014 WL 12773672. 
338. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 39, Zaatari v. City of Austin, 615 S.W.3d 
172 (Tex. App. 2019) (No. 03-17-00812-CV), 2017 WL 11549951. Atypical cases involved failure to 
provide winter maintenance on a public road and enforcement of fire safety regulations. The first dispute 
was settled, and the second resulted in summary judgment in favor of the city along with attorneys’ fees 
and costs. 
339.  95 F. Supp. 3d 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2015). 
340. See id. at 1379. 
341. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant City of Miami Beach’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings at 16, Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2015) 
(No. 1:13–cv-23620–CMA), 2014 WL 12781439. 












Several briefs featured the improper t in support of arguments that 
government regulators had violated the Takings Clause by itself or along 
with procedural or substantive due process violations. Landowners were 
unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for alleged takings involving a 
zoning amendment preventing a lessee from opening a trailer park;343 a 
rezoning to prohibit mining;344 the county’s enforcement of an improperly 
adopted comprehensive plan;345 an error in the town zoning map;346 the 
disqualification of a nonconforming use because the owner did not secure a 
license; 347  the imposition of grading restrictions on rear portions of 
beachfront properties;348 and the city’s refusal to approve a development 
plan.349 
The PLF, the NHLB, and other groups and attorneys who worked 
tirelessly to protect private property rights of landowners submitted several 
other briefs alleging takings. In 1994 Gideon Kanner’s client, the Romona 
Convent of the Holy Names, unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review 
of a city’s denial of permission to sell part of a parcel zoned for open space 
in order to pay for expenses caused by an earthquake.350 Kanner accused the 
California Court of Appeal of ignoring “the policy which underlies the just 
compensation clause,”351 part of which is that the “Court has consistently 
recognized that the right to use one's property reasonably is an essential 
right,” as supposedly embodied in the following sentence that featured the 
	
343. See Motion of Appellant to Set Aside Per Curiam Order Entered May 29, 1950, Sustaining 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Want of a Substantial Federal Question & Brief in Support at 7–8, 
Glissmann v. Omaha, 339 U.S. 960 (1950) (No. 792), 1950 WL 78443. 
344. See Brief of Appellant at 37, Nello L. Teer Co. v. Orange Cnty., 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 
1993) (unpublished table decision) (No. 92-2240), 1992 WL 12124760. 
345. See Appellant’s Initial Brief at 26–27, Rood v. Pinellas Cnty., 15 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(unpublished table decision) (No. 92-3168), 1993 WL 13138280. 
346. See Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant’s Brief in Response to Defendants’ Brief & in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Cross-Appeal at 13-14, Brunelle v. Town of S. Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075 (R.I. 1997) (No. 
95-0489), 1996 WL 34361740. 
347. See Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants Veronica & Gene Stepak at 12, 
Castella v. Stepak, 684 N.E.2d 703 (Ohio 1997) (No. 97-1329), 1997 WL 33758021. 
348. See Brief of the NAHB et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 10, Buckley v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 528 U.S. 816 (1999) (No. 98-1894), 1999 WL 33640424. 
349. See Brief of Appellant, MK&K Realty, Inc. at 17, MK&K Realty, Inc. v. Worthington City 
Council, 2013 WL 6506501 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (No. 13 AP 000375), 2013 WL 5410427. 
350. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–6, Ramona Convent of the Holy Names v. City of 
Alhambra, 513 U.S. 927 (1994) (No. 94-84), 1994 WL 16042610 [hereinafter Roman Convent Amicus 
Brief]; see also Brief of the NAHB et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 10, Buckley v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 528 U.S. 816 (1999) (No. 98-1894), 1999 WL 33640424 (including Roberge 
misquotation in support of proposition that “THE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF LAND IS A 
PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION—EXCEPT IN CALIFORNIA”). 











improper t.352 Kanner also included the following quotation from Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission:353 
“[T]he right to build on one's own property—even though its exercise can 
be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements—cannot remotely be 
described as a ‘governmental benefit.’”354 It is at best hyperbolic, however, 
to offer this quoted language out of context to prove that the Supreme Court 
has established that the Court was speaking about an “essential right.” 
Only one year later, James Burling, in his PLF amicus brief in support 
of the plaintiff-appellant in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,355 also employed 
this faux-Roberge + Nollan one-two punch in an ineffective effort to 
demonstrate how the city’s imposition of a requirement that a developer pay 
over $300,000 in recreational and art fees violated “the right to put his 
property to reasonable use.”356 Burling then attempted to push the takings 
envelope even further, asserting that, in a departure from precedent, “a 
fundamental right is involved,” and citing the problematic “‘substantially 
advance’ test of takings jurisprudence” that the court abandoned ten years 
later in Lingle.357 
This sampling of briefs suggests that counsel who invoked the improper 
t in an attempt to bolster the purportedly weak judicial protection of the 
property rights of disgruntled landowners have to date been generally 
unsuccessful. The hard right turn in the federal judiciary effected by Trump 
appointments to district and appellate courts could very well favor those 
making pro-property rights (and, in turn anti-government regulation) 
arguments. That is one more reason why it is time to correct the mistake 
planted in 1928 that has yielded a long and curious harvest in case law, 
articles, books, briefs, motions, and other legal documents. 
IV. A MISTAKE THAT MATTERS 
It would be absurd to think that all “arbitrary and capricious” 
government action violates substantive due process . . . . The 
judicially created substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
protects, we have said, certain “fundamental liberty interest[s]” from 
deprivation by the government, unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Freedom from delay in 
	
352. Id. at 22. 
353. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
354. Id. at 834 n.2 (quoted in Roman Convent Amicus Brief, supra note 350, at 22). 
355. Amicus Curiae Brief of PLF in Support of App[ellant], Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 
P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (No. S033642), 1995 WL 17036308. 
356. Id. at 6. Burling made two mistakes here—he includes the improper t and he refers to the 
case as “Roley,” not Roberge. Id.  











receiving a building permit is not among these “fundamental liberty 
interests.” To the contrary, the Takings Clause allows government 
confiscation of private property so long as it is taken for a public use 
and just compensation is paid; mere regulation of land use need not 
be “narrowly tailored” to effectuate a “compelling state interest.” 
Those who claim “arbitrary” deprivations of nonfundamental liberty 
interests must look to the Equal Protection Clause . . . . 
Justice Antonin Scalia358 
[N]o distinction between permanent and temporary flooding was 
material to the result in Sanguinetti.359 We resist reading a single 
sentence unnecessary to the decision as having done so much work. 
In this regard, we recall Chief Justice Marshall’s sage observation 
that “general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in 
connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they 
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control 
the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented 
for decision.” 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg360 
 
The opposing jurisprudence and deep friendship between the late authors 
of these two passages are legendary, but that is not the reason their words 
introduce this discussion. The Justices’ important points help us to 
understand the implications of efforts to use the Roberge error to advance 
due process and takings law beyond their current limitations. The improper 
t matters for two reasons. First, the narrower legacy of this simple error can 
help us to understand how current Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Takings Clause doctrines work in tandem to protect property rights while 
maintaining the proper deference to legislative and administrative officials. 
Second, in the broader context, the tale of the improper t exposes the 
vulnerability of our system of constitutional lawmaking that, if judges are 
not mindful, can be tied too rigidly to the strictures of stare decisis. 
	
358. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003) (Scalia J., 
concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)). 
359. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (“[I]n order to create an enforceable 
liability against the Government, it is, at least, necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the 
structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and 
not merely an injury to the property.”). 
360. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 35 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. 











A. Covering All the Bases 
There are two verities shaping the texture of land use regulation law, 
indeed the law of any government regulation that negatively affects property 
value: (1) private property rights are not absolute, and (2) government 
regulators are humans who sometimes make mistakes, are corrupt, or abuse 
their power. Even Justices Scalia and Thomas, staunch defenders of 
landowners’ rights, 361  acknowledge the first truth, as illustrated by the 
quotation above from the concurrence in the Cuyahoga Falls case. 362 
Government can take one’s private property for a public use upon the 
payment of just compensation, they remind us, and “mere regulation of land 
use” is not subject to the strict scrutiny protecting fundamental individual 
rights. If the second proposition were not true, that is, if governmental 
regulators were infallible, there would be no need for the constitutional 
protections afforded by the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection 
Clauses and their judicial glosses.  
Judges, authors, and advocates have attempted to employ the improper t 
to supercharge the Takings Clause and to elevate the ownership of property 
to fundamental rights status. If the Court had already done the former, then 
property owners would not have to jump through so many procedural and 
substantive hoops while maneuvering through the jurisprudential swamp of 
takings law, in order to recover just compensation for regulations that 
reduce or eliminate the value of property. If the Court had already done the 
latter, then property owners would benefit from elevated judicial scrutiny, 
forcing government officials to demonstrate a close fit between the goals of 
their regulations (ends) and the specific methods employed to realize those 
goals (means).363 But, as we now know, the Supreme Court never said that 
the purported right to devote land to any legitimate use is in itself property. 
Is there nothing private property rights advocates can do to redress 
government abuses? To answer “yes” would ignore three important changes 
over the last few decades. First, several states have passed takings statutes 
to augment purportedly weak Supreme Court protections.364 While these 
	
361. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505–23 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (featuring Justice Scalia’s majority opinion). 
362. See City of Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 200 (Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence). 
363. See id. 
364. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 78 (2016) (“Six states (Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, 
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be required by Supreme Court doctrine.”). See generally John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, 
The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENV’T 











state legislative efforts have a mixed track record,365 there is evidence that 
they have at least a chilling effect on government land regulations.366 
Second, counsel for landowners who have been victimized by 
government corruption, ineptitude, or bias have had some success in 
convincing the Supreme Court to bolster private property rights protections. 
Since 2000 alone, the Justices recognized an equal protection “class of one” 
challenge brought against retributive local government officials;367 allowed 
a lawsuit to proceed in which a landowner alleged that the government 
improperly sought to extract monetary payments in exchange for 
development permission;368 and removed a significant ripeness requirement 
for takings lawsuits brought in federal court.369 In addition, even before all 
three Trump appointees joined the Court, several Justices recognized the 
possibility of judicial takings370 and objected to a five-member majority’s 
reinforcement of the parcel-as-a-whole test for partial and total takings.371  
Third, state high courts have recognized that their own constitutions 
provide greater protection than the “property Clauses” in the U.S. 
Constitution as currently interpreted by the Court. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire, in a case involving the denial of a variance for a halfway 
house, stated, “As the right to use and enjoy property is an important 
substantive right, we use our intermediate scrutiny test to review equal 
protection challenges to zoning ordinances that infringe upon this right.”372 
In deeming unconstitutional all amortization schemes for nonconformities, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained,  
The Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, § 1, . . . protects the 
right of a property owner to use his or her property in any lawful way 
that he or she so chooses. If government desires to interfere with the 
owner’s use, where the use is lawful and is not a nuisance nor is it 
abandoned, it must compensate the owner for the resulting loss.373  
The Supreme Court of Texas, in declaring rolling easements invalid, opined, 
“Private property ownership pre-existed the Republic of Texas and the 
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444–46. 
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367. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).  
368. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013). 
369. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
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constitutions of both the United States and Texas. Both constitutions protect 
these rights in private property as essential and fundamental rights of the 
individual in a free society.”374  
If property rights advocates are concerned about the plight of individual 
landowners who suffer financially at the hands of arbitrary and irrational 
state and local land use regulators, they have no need to resort to legal 
chestnuts buried in 1920s zoning cases, especially one that only appears in 
sources that contain a typographical error. If, as the author and others 
suspect, zoning law is the stalking horse for a more ambitious rights-based 
attack on regulations designed for environmental protection, sustainability, 
climate change resiliency, and the development of alternatives to fossil 
fuels,375 it is long past time to stop this mistake-based and misguided move 
dead in its tracks.  
B. The Fragility of Stare Decisis 
The principle of stare decisis is the leitmotif of American constitutional 
and common-law decision making. 376  Advocates emphasize those 
precedents that support their client’s position and seek to marginalize 
potentially damaging language from previous decisions by labeling it 
“dictum,” often preceded by a dismissive adjective—“mere.”377 Judges, too, 
feel compelled to pay heed to the rules and doctrines gleaned from previous 
rulings, even when they craft creative work-arounds, as with Justice 
Ginsburg’s refusal in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United 
States378 to follow the “letter” of the 88-year-old opinion in Sanguinetti v. 
United States.379 The 1924 case specifically said that “in order to create an 
enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, necessary that 
the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual, 
permanent invasion of the land,”380 and the facts before the 2012 Court 
involved “government-induced flooding [that was] temporary in 
	
374. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. 2012) (footnote omitted) (citations 
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375. See Wolf, supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
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Supreme Court opinions are cited and quoted frequently, and immediately: by 
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377. See, e.g., Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023–24 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That 
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duration.”381 Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg, invoking in support the words 
of a 181-year-old opinion by the Chief Justice in chief—John Marshall—
sought to minimalize the key word used by Justice Sutherland: 
We do not read so much into the word “permanent” as it appears in a 
nondispositive sentence in Sanguinetti. That case, we note, was 
decided in 1924, well before the World War II-era cases and First 
English, 382  in which the Court first homed in on the matter of 
compensation for temporary takings. That time factor, we think, 
renders understandable the Court’s passing reference to permanence. 
If the Court indeed meant to express a general limitation on the 
Takings Clause, that limitation has been superseded by subsequent 
developments in our jurisprudence.383 
The passage of time and jurisprudential developments in the interim thus 
negated the permanence of the rhetoric in Sanguinetti. 
Labeling troublesome words from previous decisions as not “material to 
the result” (mere dictum) or as “superseded by subsequent developments” 
(outdated) are but two strategies employed by judges to respect in theory 
the principle of stare decisis while achieving the opposite outcome 
suggested by precedent.384 Even if one calls these stratagems or artifices, 
they still serve the important function of instilling and maintaining respect 
for the letter and spirit of the written word, the lifeblood of law. It is and 
should not be easy to depart from the demands of precedent. 
The second moral gained from the cautionary tale of the improper t lies 
in our recognition of the fragility of stare decisis. If the error in the original 
printing of Roberge had never been caught and corrected, then an 
unknowable number of due process and takings cases could have proceeded 
past motions to dismiss and summary judgments, giving owners and 
developers who were denied permission to make more lucrative use of their 
property the upper hand in negotiations conducted in the shadow of a 
threatened trial.  Unquestionably, the pressure just to give in would be great 
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383. Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 35. 
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as, thanks to the development of § 1983 385  and regulatory takings 
jurisprudence386 beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, government officials 
who refused to recognize that the landowner’s right to make any legitimate 
use of property was itself constitutionally protected property would proceed 
at their peril, and at the risk of losing their positions. 
If the original error in Roberge had never been corrected in the official 
reporter, if the right to make any legitimate use of property (even if that use 
required a permit) were itself property protected by the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses, then various types of conditional permitting—sought by 
those eager to develop or extract resources from wetlands, forests and other 
critical habitats, floodplains, beachfront parcels containing sand dunes, 
mountainsides and canyons, historic landmarks, and the like—would today 
be even more at risk of invalidation. Would there be a Justice Ginsburg to 
point out that the sentence containing the now-proper t was not “material to 
the result” in Roberge (which was after all an improper delegation case)387 
or was “superseded by subsequent developments” in real property 
jurisprudence? 388  What a difference a lone letter can make in our 
wonderfully quaint and curious world of stare decisis. 
CONCLUSION: REINING IN ERROR 
For more than a century, law review students checking citations for 
others’ work and quoting sources for their own notes and comments, interns 
and externs helping to prepare trial and appellate briefs, research assistants 
working on articles and books for their professors, and judicial clerks 
drafting or proofreading opinions and orders are taught to check original 
and official sources, especially if those sources are cases and statutes. 
Relying on electronic case services, unofficial reporters, headnotes, syllabi, 
and other shortcuts is (at least officially) verboten. This Article shows what 
happened when this best practice was not followed, as a one-letter mistake 
(“property” instead of “properly”) in the middle of an unremarkable 1928 
Supreme Court opinion has appeared uncorrected dozens of times in 
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reported opinions in state and federal courts, headnotes, articles, books, 
briefs, and Supreme Court oral argument. Because this Article has exposed 
how by chance the mistake actually changed the substantive meaning of the 
true language in the decision, the strong property rights arguments made by 
many authors and advocates during this reign of error are weakened as a 
result. 
There are two morals from this cautionary tale of the improper t. First, 
there are three constitutional clauses—Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Takings—that already provide robust protections for the private property 
rights of landowners who allege that government officials have passed and 
enforced arbitrary and confiscatory land use regulations. In several 
jurisdictions, these protections are supplemented by takings statutes and by 
a more vigorous interpretation of protections afforded by state constitutions. 
And, if even that is not enough, advocates can lobby state lawmakers for 
additional measures or seek to convince the newly restocked and right-
leaning federal courts to shore up any perceived weaknesses in the 
perceived private property rights bulwark. Thanks to the findings in this 
Article, from now on they will have one less precedential arrow in their 
quiver. 
The second moral from the saga of the improper t is that we must always 
remember the fragility of a system of judicial decision-making that is based 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. One sentence, one word, even one letter can 
affect the outcome of future cases, or can force counsel and courts 
cautiously to offer persuasive arguments for marginalizing those undesired 
or errant written legacies imparted by our legal past.  
